



MCTP 3-03A

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations



U.S. Marine Corps

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Foreword

In any type of environment and across the competition continuum, Marine Corps commanders must determine how best to engage the civilian populace to accomplish their mission. This publication provides the doctrinal foundation for Fleet Marine Forces to understand, plan, and execute civil-military operations.

Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 3-03A, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations* provides the guidance, framework, and methods for the commander to engage with the civil dimension across the competition continuum. This enables the commander to both minimize the impact of Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operations on the civilian population, as well as minimize the impact of the civilian population on MAGTF operations.

This publication's key audience is the MAGTF commander and staff ranging from the Marine expeditionary force to the Marine expeditionary unit, as well as infantry regiments and battalions. This MCTP enables commander's and staff to integrate the civil dimension of the operating environment into operational planning and execution in order to fulfill legal and moral requirements in the modern, complex operating environment.

Marine Corps leaders at every level should understand the concepts and employment considerations for both civil-military operations and civil affairs described in this publication.

This publication supersedes MCTP 3-03A, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations*, dated 2 May 2016.



B. D. GREENE
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding Officer
Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group

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CHAPTER 1

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

Civil-military operations (CMO) are the activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs (CA) or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. (Joint Publication [JP] 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*). Strategic competitors, operating below the threshold of armed conflict, employ a mixture of instruments of national power to achieve significant strategic advantages. They act in a manner calculated not only to avoid triggering a legal right to respond by force but to attract and persuade other states to align with their interests. Civilian and military leadership need to recognize and understand how to describe and participate in this competitive operational environment (OE) effectively.

In any type of environment and across the range of military operations, Marine Corps commanders must determine how best to engage the civilian populace to accomplish their missions. This publication provides a framework from which to understand, plan, and execute CMO for the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). The Marine Corps has been engaged in CMO since its inception, in environments as diverse as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, the Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In some of these operations, civil-military considerations were paramount and their effective incorporation into planning often determined an operation's success or failure, such as the operations in the Caribbean and Central America that were also known as the Banana Wars, which were fought during the 1920s and 1930s. To capture these hard-learned lessons, the Marine Corps first published the Small Wars Manual in 1940. It was later republished in 1990 as Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-15, *Small Wars Manual*.

Civil-military operations apply at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Marines deploy across the globe to support regional engagement strategies and further national goals through the forward presence of expeditionary units. Marines are involved in multinational training activities and exercises that contribute to international cooperation and stability. Marines respond to complex emergencies, such as natural disasters that overwhelm civil authorities. Marines also contribute to peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, and they are prepared to use force or the threat of force to deter conflict. If efforts to preserve peace fail, focused military capability is carefully employed to accomplish national objectives swiftly and with as little loss of life as possible. Once hostilities conclude, military forces contribute to stabilization, recovery, and the peaceful transition of control back to civil authorities. Therefore, military operations are more than the simple application of forces, arms, and equipment. Each operation has a civil dimension. The civil dimension requires that commanders consider how their actions affect, and are affected by, civil society. This is vital for the success of the information warfighting function. Civil-military operations and CA contribute to both direct and indirect approaches to gaining the information advantage by understanding the civil environment through CA activities to achieve objectives. For further information, see Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 8, *Information*.

At times, military forces might be required to perform activities and functions, usually the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or after other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Designated CA units, other military forces, or a combination of civil affairs and other forces may perform CMO. Therefore, a MAGTF will need to carefully develop, nurture, and maintain positive relations between themselves and the relevant United States (US) interagency partners, indigenous people, governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) in their area of operations (AO). Effective CMO assists military commanders in meeting their international obligations to civilians and in achieving MAGTF objectives.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM

Marines conduct operations across the competition continuum to achieve joint force objectives. The competition continuum describes a world of enduring competition, conducted through a mixture of cooperation, adversarial competition below armed conflict, and conflict. Civil-military operations play a key role in activities to entice, induce, or persuade elements of a population to support Marine operations, or at least not hinder them. Additionally, they provide critical insight to civil considerations across the operating environment during competition, including governance, infrastructure, perceptions, interagency coordination, and multi-national activities. These insights can help a commander develop and monitor enticement methods, particularly when executing stability activities, irregular warfare activities, and transitional military authority.

The Marine Corps, as a naval expeditionary force in readiness, is both forward deployed and forward postured to support globally integrated operations across the competition continuum. Cooperation, competition, and conflict can occur simultaneously with the same strategic actor. Civil-military operations occur across the competition continuum, primarily in support of military, and when necessary, to support interagency and other governmental operations.

Cooperation

Cooperation is an enduring activity with an ally or partner that continues into the foreseeable future. Civil-military operations are integral to maintaining and building partnerships, particularly in contested regions. The MAGTF plays a significant role in the cooperation space with partners around the world by conducting CMO to support civic actions, humanitarian relief, capacity building, and combined exercises. Cooperation activities are deliberately planned and resourced, as part of MAGTF and Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) operations. Sustained cooperation provides the MAGTF with access, basing, overflight, and most importantly, the relationships necessary to compete, deter, and when necessary, fight and win.

Competition

Competition is more protracted in comparison to armed conflict and occurs in a less certain environment than cooperation. A military capability that provides critical insight to civil considerations across the operating environment during competition are MAGTF CMO. This provides the MAGTF and Joint commander's relationships, access, and insight to civil considerations including governance, infrastructure, perceptions, interagency coordination, and

multi-national activities. Maneuver through the competition space is built upon CMO in the cooperation space.

Conflict

Conflict and war require the MAGTF to conduct CMO in the affected region to triage civil sector activities while enduring capacity is rebuilt. These activities range from interorganizational cooperation to civil affairs operations (CAO) to civil information management (CIM). Marine CA forces are designed to support these activities within a battlespace typically assigned to a MAGTF and might require the activation of a full civil affairs group (CAG). The MAGTF will not operate unilaterally, and CA forces are integral to interagency, interorganizational, and multi-national post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction activities.

The competition continuum provides a conceptual framework for Joint Force operations, within which the MAGTF and other FMF capabilities will be tasked with to achieve Joint objectives. Marine air-ground task force CMO are integral to prevailing in competition with strategic adversaries.

Marines may be called upon to simultaneously execute a variety of missions across the competition continuum and Marines might be required to conduct major operations or campaigns in a wide array of countries or regions; therefore, the MAGTF must be prepared to conduct CMO across the competition continuum anywhere in the world.

Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*, describes how the joint force organizes for globally integrated operations across the competition continuum in support of integrated deterrence. Figure 1-1 depicts how CMO underpin the preferred approach to competition through assurance, persuasion, attraction, and mutual benefit. The expeditionary character of the Marine Corps allows it to conduct, support, or enable CMO with allies and partners anywhere in the world. Typically, the Marine Corps deploys a MAGTF that can conduct CMO.




Figure 1-1. Notional Operations Across the Competition Continuum.

There are numerous CMO capabilities within the MAGTF, including civil affairs Marines, influence Marines, as well as engineering, logistics, reconnaissance, medical, assault support, and security capabilities. In the contemporary operating environment, Marines will support joint force objectives through cooperation, competition, and conflict in pursuit of integrated deterrence. This will occur within a globally integrated framework aligning multiple activities to achieve joint force objectives. While CMO will rarely be the main effort for a MAGTF, it is imperative that Marines understand the critical role that CMO provides within the competition continuum.

Assurance

Assurance is using the military instrument to demonstrate commitment and support to US allies and partners. Assurance often takes the form of security cooperation, combined exercises, and forward stationing of US forces. It can also take the form of stabilization to provide security and meet the basic human needs of populations in conflict-affected areas. This includes foreign humanitarian assistance as a demonstration of commitment to the international order and support to those in need.

Deterrence

Deterrence is the prevention of undesired action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or the belief that the costs of action outweigh the perceived benefits. The joint force deters by maintaining joint readiness, demonstrating the ability to project power globally, reinforcing narratives, stationing forces forward, and conducting multinational security cooperation and training.

Compellence

Compellence is the use, or threat of use, of violent military force to change enemy or adversary behavior. It is frequently used in conjunction with diplomacy. Effective compellence requires blending with information and diplomacy. Sometimes successful compellence requires economic measures. Compellence differs from deterrence in that the adversary has already taken an action contrary to US interests. Rather than maintaining the status quo, compellence is the application of force to increase the pressure on an enemy or adversary through escalation or denial.

Compellence by escalation seeks to increase costs to force an enemy or adversary to choose to stop pursuing a particular approach. Compellence by denial uses military means to convince an adversary they are unable to achieve their objective at a reasonable cost. Compellence provides flexibility; however, it relies on a deep and accurate empathetic perspective of the adversary and the underlying causes of their behavior. Ultimately, the choice remains with the enemy or adversary to continue the COA if the will is strong enough.

Forcible Action

Forcible action is the violent application of military force used to project our will on the enemy by eliminating their resistance. If an enemy values an objective that threatens our national security above all else, it is imperative to remove those in power or use military force to destroy that which gives the enemy the will to resist. To force an enemy, there must be the national will to win and the means available to do it decisively. Force action requires strong national commitment. The three basic methods to prevail in armed conflict against an enemy are exhaustion, attrition, and annihilation. Rarely employed in isolation from the others, exhaustion is the erosion of the enemy's will, attrition is the process of gradually reducing their strength or effectiveness, and annihilation is the complete destruction of the enemy's means. Against a capable and determined enemy, the joint force should not expect any of these methods to be easy, fast, or inexpensive. Additionally, the joint force should not expect military victory to be a forgone conclusion.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS FUNCTIONS

Civil military operations are an inherent responsibility of the commander to leverage relationships between their forces and IPI to specifically achieve or maintain stability. The three major components of CMO are—

- Civil military relations.
- Enabling operations.
- Information management.

These core functions are designed to support CMO on behalf of the MAGTF commander (see Figure 1-2). Civil military operations will be conducted by a combination of CA forces and other military forces. The MAGTF commander should recognize CA capability and capacity gaps that require the use of other military forces. Civil affairs (Civil Affairs Forces) are designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support CMO. Civil affairs operations are those actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the

interaction with, the civil component of the OE; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills usually the responsibility of civil government.

Civil-Military Operations (CMO)		
Civil-Military Relations	Enabling Operations	Information Management
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indigenous Populations and Institutions • Interorganizational Cooperation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil Affairs Operations • Medical CMO • Military Government • Military Police Operations • Engineer Operations • Military Information Support Operations • Public Affairs • Cyberspace • Sustainment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil Information Management • Medical Intelligence • Police Intelligence • Geospatial Engineering • Target Audience Analysis

Figure 1-2. Civil-Military Operations Functions.

Marine CA forces are distinct from US Army CA forces in that Marine CA forces are trained, equipped, and organized as “generalists” and leverage the MAGTF to support both CAO and CMO. The US Army produces functional specialists that include rule of law, economic, stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. Marine CAGs maintain a rule of law and public health capability and are trained to integrate functional specialists during large scale stability, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare activities. It is incumbent on the MAGTF commander to clearly understand levels of CA expertise assigned to them and to immediately request additional assistance or develop organic capability in the CA functional areas lacking expertise or capacity.

Understanding the 16 functions across each of the three components of CMO is fundamental to designing activities of the MAGTF commander that facilitate military operations and optimal use of CA forces. Civil-military relations involve those actions that build and maintain relationships and cooperation mechanisms with IPI. Interorganizational cooperation is the coordination among

the United States Government (USG), partner nations, the joint force, NGOs, international organizations, and the private sector with the IPI, for more information.

Figure 1-3 is an illustration of the interrelationship of CMO and CA activities pertaining to unified action.




Figure 1-3. Interrelationship of Unified Action, Civil-Military Operations, and Civil Affairs.

Enabling operations include CAO, medical civil-military operations (MCMO), transitional military government and support to civil administration, engineer activities, stability activities, military information support operations (MISO), communication strategy and operations (COMMSTRAT) activities, cyberspace operations, and other influence operations. These enabling operations and activities are executed by Service or functional component commands supporting the joint force commander (JFC).

Each of these enabling operations and activities produces information that promotes situational understanding of the OE, specifically as that information applies to the civil component. This information allows the JFC to obtain knowledge of the OE and the systems, links, and nodes that comprise the society that exists within the OE.

These functions include employing CAO with related CMO capabilities within the MAGTF. Finally, these two components are integrated within the information management component and its functions to analyze, synthesize, and produce products that build situational awareness of the civil dimension and support decision making.

FACILITATING CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

The MAGTF will seek to minimize the effect a mission has on the local populace and the effect the populace has on the mission. To achieve this, Marines will build relationships with IPI that support, and at times perform, civil activities and functions to varying degrees. Regardless of combat intensity, commanders and Marines must consider how to build strong civil rapport and support while judiciously applying military resources to create the following outcomes:

- Minimize civilian interference; maximize support.
- Allow the MAGTF commander to meet legal and ethical obligations.
- Enable and support the MAGTF commander's selected course of action (COA).
- Gain situational awareness.
- Enhance freedom of action.
- Isolate the enemy.
- Enhance legitimacy of MAGTF in the eyes of the civilian population.
- Help shape the civil dimension of the battlespace.
- Increase acceptance of the MAGTF and its mission at local, regional, and national levels.
- Establish clear goals and outcomes for activities in the cooperation, competition, and conflict space.

Effective Communications

There will be numerous stakeholders across the OE with whom the MAGTF must coordinate, cooperate, and communicate. These stakeholders range from IPI, coalition forces, interorganizational partners, host nation (HN) military and security forces, religious, tribal, family, and civic leaders. Communication is a cornerstone to successful CMO, and requires the employment of people, processes, and equipment. Marine CA can provide the people and design the processes – usually through the CIM plan - best suited to communicate with the civil population within the OE, and they can also recommend the optimal equipment and systems to connect all these stakeholders.

In contrast to most military operations, CMO requires coordination with non-US military personnel that might not have security clearances nor be familiar with modern military command and control systems. The ability to share relevant civil information is a critical element in communication during CMO. The civil-military operations center (CMOC), a CA function, facilitates CMO between the military, IPI, NGOs, and international organizations. The CMOC integrates systems, people, and processes to ensure clear and effective communication between the MAGTF and local populations.

In addition to the above processes and systems, the MAGTF will require language and cultural expertise to fully understand how to effectively communicate with IPI. This might require the use of interpreters, as well as reach back capability to cultural experts that might include foreign

area officers and regional area officers, US embassy personnel, and related capabilities within the Department of Defense (DoD). At a minimum, CA Marines are trained to analyze the civil dimension of the OE and can provide initial insight into the best communication methods for the MAGTF.

Ethical Actions and Conduct

Marine air-ground task force commanders should understand ethical obligations to civilian populations. The law of land warfare dictates the commander's legal obligations and moral responsibilities to the civilian population within the OE and CMO are the primary approach to reduce or prevent detrimental effects to the HN population that enable the seamless execution of military operations in support of military objectives.

Cultural Awareness

Cross cultural competency is a critical skill and capability for CMO and CAO. It is broadly described as the ability to effectively communicate across various cultural contexts—including national, ethnic, organizational, generational, and ideological spectrums. Successful and effective CMO occur when commanders leverage those Marines who display strong attributes of cross-cultural competence. This enables Marines to build rapport and establish trust with the local populations and civilian partners.

There are two tools designed to support CMO analysis, understanding, and competency in the civil dimension: civil preparation of the battlespace (CPB) and the civil information management (CIM) plan. The most in-depth analysis is provided by the CPB, which is described in Appendix A. While not as in depth as the CPB, the civil information plan provides key data and information that enables insight into how a culture operates. Though the CIM process does not provide the same degree of insight as the CPB, it is iterative and provides a start point to build cross cultural competency.

In addition to CPB and CIM, the Marine Corps invests in foreign and regional affairs officers and specialists who have received advanced regional, cultural, and language training in specific countries and regions. They are experienced in cross-cultural competencies, have earned advanced educations, and in the case of foreign affairs officers and specialists, have validated language proficiency. These Marines possess the most refined attributes for cross-cultural competency, however, given the investment required to develop their capabilities, there are few. Regardless, they provide outsized value in supporting CMO when the right foreign or regional affairs officers or specialists can be identified.

Conflict Resolution

A critical enabler in CMO are negotiation and mediation skills necessary to resolve conflicts across cultural domains. Marines will often find themselves conducting missions where civil, social, and other conflicts exist within the OE. While it is unlikely that Marines will be able to resolve the root causes of those conflicts, they are often viewed as neutral arbiters in a dispute which enables them to provide a forum for negotiating or mediating these conflicts sufficient to restore and maintain stability.

In particular, CA Marines are trained in basic cross-cultural competencies, civil engagement, and negotiation and mediation skills that enable the MAGTF and FMF to identify and develop approaches to social, civil, and related conflicts in the OE that drive instability. Additionally, the civil-military relations component to CMO leverages interorganizational cooperation and IPI that can build or restore local mechanisms to address and resolve social, civil, and related conflicts.

Civil-Military Operations Engagements

Civil-military operations engagements may provide information and/or influence attitudes, perceptions, and behavior. These engagements provide a venue for building relationships, solving conflicts, conveying information, calming fears, and refuting rumors, lies, or misinformation. Effective integration of these engagements into daily operations has the potential to mitigate negative unintended consequences, counter adversary propaganda activities, and increase local support for friendly forces.

CHAPTER 2

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO MAGTF CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

In any military operation, commanders need to consider how the civil dimension affects their operations and in turn how their operations affect the civil dimension. Civilian populations, organizations, and leaders add considerable variables to the already chaotic and uncertain battlefield environment. Civil considerations must be identified, assessed, and integrated as components of the MAGTF's larger operations in support of unified action.

Civil affairs forces are the commander's subject matter experts (SMEs) for the civil component of the battlespace. Marine CA forces are comprised of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces trained, organized, and equipped to conduct CAO in the battlespace. Civil affairs Marines are also able to concurrently plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO and CAO across the competition continuum in support of the full range of military operations at each echelon.

Marine CA forces conduct CAO, actions that are specifically planned, coordinated, and executed to shape, influence, and manage the interaction with and actions of the civilian population in an operational environment to facilitate MAGTF access and freedom of movement. They also help to identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society.

During deliberate planning, the operations and training officer (S-3) and operational planning team (OPT) may establish a Green Cell to portray the independent thinking and reactions of civilians present in the commander's battlespace. The Green Cell identifies IPI actors and their underlying civil, social, economic, or political issues most likely to impact mission success. The Green Cell also supports war games by developing COAs based on the civilian perspective of an operation and recommends mitigation strategies. A Green Cell can include an array of US agencies and other civilian stakeholders.

Upon the commander's direction, CA forces may establish a CMOC in the operational area to serve as the commander's interface between Marines forces, IPI, non-governmental and international organizations, multinational forces and USG departments and agencies.

Domestically, CA forces may be requested to support civilian government and agency disaster operations. When authorized by the Stafford Act and prescribed by Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*, military commanders may respond to a request for assistance (RFA) from a civil authority to provide military resources or equipment to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage within the US.

When directed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), CA forces may be deployed to support civilian operations overseas, such as a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) or military

government operations including transitional military authority and support to civil administration (SCA) in support of the Department of State (DoS).

THE CIVIL AFFAIRS ROLE

Civil Affairs forces' primary role is to assist the MAGTF commander in mitigating the effects of the civil environment on the MAGTF's operations. Mitigating the effects of the civil environment on MAGTF operations is not limited to simply preventing interference with current operations. Mitigation includes actions in the civil environment across the competition continuum. To this end, CMO and CAO nest within the operations and training staff section (G-3) or S-3. They closely partner with fires in support of both lethal and nonlethal target and effects planning, and regularly contribute to the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). During periods of cooperation and competition, most of the threat network engagements are executed using nonlethal means to create effects.

Commanders and staff rely on CA trained forces in the operational area to identify, advise the use of, and leverage CMO and CAO opportunities and evaluate their outcomes to support MAGTF operational objectives. Civil affairs forces often work with the commander's medical, engineer, logistics, Chaplain, and Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) when developing options to achieve mission goals. Civil Affairs, MISO, and COMMSTRAT habitually coordinate with other information capabilities as they regularly operate in the same battlespace, and often engage the same audiences.

Priority of action is (1) to identify and mitigate risks to military operations to and from the civil component, and (2) facilitate the protection of populations, culturally significant sites, and critical infrastructure to meet the commander's legal and moral responsibilities while conducting their mission objectives.

CIVIL AFFAIRS CONTRIBUTION TO INFORMATION ADVANTAGE

At the operational and tactical levels of warfare, an information advantage is an exploitable condition resulting from one actor's ability to generate, preserve, deny, and project information more effectively than another. All FMF create and exploit the three functions of information advantage —along with other decision, temporal, spatial, or psychological advantages — to achieve military objectives and impose our will against the adversary. Civil affairs operations contribute to the commander's decision making across the competition-conflict continuum through its core competencies and capabilities to enable accurate, flexible, and timely responses to MAGTF challenges in the civil environment.

Prevailing Narrative

Prevailing narrative is an overarching message that is both credible and emotionally true with the intended audience. A successful prevailing narrative results in public opinion or perception advantages for FMF by eliciting trust, credibility, and believability in our presence, mission, and objectives. It emphasizes engagement with civilian, government and military organizations across tactical and operational organizations. Prevailing narrative is supported by civil engagement, civil reconnaissance (CR), establishment of a hasty or deliberate CMOC and

COMMSTRAT, and complemented by parallel civil-military integration, MISO, and deputy development advisor (DDA). Prevailing narrative leverages combatant command and DoS strategies.

Force Resiliency

Force resiliency embodies the profound adapt and overcome trait demonstrated by the FMF. A Marine's ability to resist, counter, and prevail against enemy and adversary reconnaissance, technical disruptions, and malign activity including misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda, deny the adversary's ability to undermine Marine targets, systems and will to fight. In the battlespace, force resilience brings the 'mental fight' to the adversary through targeted operational and tactical human engagements, including information projection and information denial, to create informational, mental, and physical effects advantageous to Marine Corps forces and operations. Force resilience is directly supported by civil engagement, CR, MISO, COMMSTRAT, DDA, and complemented by parallel CMOC, civil-military integration, MISO, and DDA operations.

CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES COMPOSITION

The CAG is a Reserve Component organization and maintains the preponderance of the Marine Corps' CA forces. Upon receipt of the mission, the CAG commander or senior CA detachment commander is typically dual-hatted as the assistant chief of staff, civil affairs (G-9) staff officer but does not retain command authority of CAG forces. The majority of CAG CA Marines operate in small units at the tactical level. The CAG supports a Marine expeditionary force (MEF) or joint task force (JTF) with a G-9 staff and multiple CA detachments. A CA detachment supports a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), Marine expeditionary force information group (MIG), regimental combat team (RCT) or regimental landing team (RLT) with an S-9 and CA teams. The CA detachment is comprised of three CA teams and a headquarters (HQ) element of five CA Marines. A CA team supports a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) or battalion. Each CA team contains four CA Marines.

All CA Marines' elements regularly report their real-time observations, assessments, and analyses of the civil component of the commander's battlespace through formal official channels. Civil Affairs Marines also share information through informal unofficial channels, including civilian organizations, according to approved operations security (OPSEC) levels and need to share to increase situational awareness of the civil battlespace.

The G-9 Staff Officer

The G-9 is the commander's designated staff member and resource for timely and accurate information, analysis, and advice concerning the civil component. The G-9 leads the staff section for the coordination and synchronization of CMO in operations planning, targeting, and assessments. The G-9 also prioritizes and manages the funds and resources designated to support MAGTF CMO objectives in the operational areas with a military occupational series (MOS) trained budgeting officer, or designated contracting or field ordering officer (FOO).

The G-9 may prepare and conduct classified and unclassified information briefings of the civil component for MAGTF staff and units, including maps and overlays of protected sites, critical

infrastructure, and displaced persons' movement and camps. The G-9 may also develop and distribute, often in coordination with MISO and COMMSTRAT, informational graphics and other resources such as frequently asked questions, useful words and phrases, and cultural best practices for use at the operational and tactical levels. The G-9 may concurrently support Marine Corps capabilities with culturally significant activities to influence civilian perception to aid maneuver freedom of movement.

When directed, the G-9 plans and coordinates with MAGTF staff and may provide CA Marines or designated CMO forces in support of a DoS NEO outside of the continental United States. In addition to providing situational awareness to the supporting commander, CA responsibilities include accounting for and registering evacuees. Upon cessation of sustained combat operations and initial transition to stabilization and civil authorities, the G-9 is the commander's representative for transitional military authority and SCA planning with USG agencies and departments, IPI and international organizations. The G-9 leads coordination with MAGTF staff sections including engineers, medical, logistics, and SJA to support DoS requests for assistance.

Civil-Military Operations Planner

Civil-military operations planners are the principal MAGTF and MEF staff members responsible for CMO and CAO in the commander's battlespace. Primary responsibilities include:

- Prepare and update CMO estimates, Annexes (Annex G, CMO) and contribute to Annex I (Information) and Annex V (Interagency Coordination) and publish after action reports (AARs).
- Plan, coordinate, and provide oversight of all CMO and CAO activities within the commander's battlespace including, but not limited to—
 - Ensuring measures are taken to control civilian movement to avoid interference with military operations.
 - Coordinating with adjacent, higher, and non-US military forces and IPI to control civilian activities, and resources affecting military operations.
 - Recommending establishment of a CMOC.
 - Protecting culturally significant sites and critical civil infrastructure; provide input to the no-strike list in coordination with fires and effects cell/fire support coordination center.
 - Coordinating with US and other military forces, IPI, and civilian agencies for the collection, care and disposition of displaced persons and refugees located in the battlespace.
 - Coordinating with US and other military forces, IPI and other civilian agencies for the evacuation and hospitalization of critically sick, wounded, and injured civilians.
 - Coordinating and oversight of US military supplies, equipment and support requested by civilian actors to meet urgent minimum physical needs of civilians in the battlespace.
 - Prioritizing and management of funds, projects, and activities supporting CMO and CAO.
 - Participating in the planning and conduct of NEO, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), populace and resources control (PRC), transitional military authority, (SCA), and civil affairs supported activities.

- Contribute to the G-3/S-3 common operational picture (COP), the intelligence staff section (G-2)/intelligence office (S-2) IPB, and the civil component of the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).
- Contribute to the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP) with a developed CPB.
- Assess requirement for CA force augmentation.
- Support the fires and effects cell/fire support coordination center and MIG information coordination center operations. The information coordination center supports the overall MEF information environment battlespace awareness efforts; the influence officer and influence chiefs use CIM to provide the civil component of the information environment to the information coordination center. Figure 2-3 is a diagram of a notional information coordination center.
- Advise placement of liaison officers (LNOs) in higher HQ and select external organizations and agencies to support or represent the MAGTF or MEF commander as events or missions require.
- Contribute to CIM, knowledge management, and/or other information fusion processes.




Figure 2-1. Notional Information Coordination Center Structure.

Civil affairs tasks are coordinated with the G-3/S-3 and CA forces receive orders through their chain of command however, the fast paced and nuanced civil environment demands a close informal working relationship between the G-9, the G-3/S-3, CMO planners, and the CA forces in the field to achieve and retain the commander’s operational tempo.

Civil Affairs Operational Forces Common Skills and Capabilities

Civil Affairs forces in the operational environment conduct CAO to coordinate military and civil activities, maximize civil support for military operations, mitigate risks to military operations by the civil component, and meet the commander’s moral and legal obligations to the civilian population in their battlespace. Civil affairs and CMO designated forces in the field are critical to the MAGTF commander’s mission success. In addition to facilitating CMO and CAO, CA forces

conduct and provide the below MOS skills in the operational environment for the supported commander:

Civil Reconnaissance. Civil reconnaissance (CR) is the targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific aspects within the civil dimension of the operating environment. Civil reconnaissance is conducted to collect civil information to engage the civilian population with precision, provide an overall enhanced understanding of the civil environment, reduce the risk of undesired secondary and tertiary effects of military operations, and capitalize on opportunities to gain the trust and confidence of the civilian population. Civil affairs forces often use the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE), and political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) tools to organize CA forces' observations. It is performed before, during, and after an operation to provide information used in the CPB process, as well as by the commander to formulate, confirm, or modify their COA. Additionally, CR supports information advantage by characterizing the operational relevance of the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the battlespace to develop opportunities and minimize threats to the desired outcomes of MAGTF operations.

Civil Engagement. Civil engagement is the targeted, planned and coordinated interaction with IPI, military forces, and unified action partners to build working relationships that reduce the impact of military operations on civilians and mitigate the impact of civilians on military operations. Civil affairs forces regularly facilitate, negotiate, and mediate civil-military activities across the conflict spectrum. Civil affairs and CMO designated forces often develop a short list of queries relating to CCIRs and PMESII/ASCOPE tools for conducting impromptu engagement opportunities.

Assessments. Civil affairs forces conduct a range of assessments of the civil environment as well as establish deliberate measures of performance (MOPs), measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) criteria in support of operational objectives. Civil affairs assessments contribute to CCIRs, CA, information functions, MISO planning and working groups, IPB, and fires and maneuver targeting effects confirmation.

Targeting. Civil affairs forces are trained in the targeting process and target audience analysis. Their focus on the civil component complements intelligence threat targeting by providing additional context, details, and potential outcomes. In addition to contributing to no-target lists, CA forces often identify opportunities, and additional or alternate lethal and nonlethal targets and strategies to exploit successes or mitigate preventable harm to IPI and other civilian actors.

Green Cell Analysis. Civil affairs forces may establish and lead a Green Cell in support of deliberate planning to analyze the civil environment more closely. Green Cell analyses assist in the development and/or modification of COAs. The Green Cell participates in the wargaming process to reveal outcomes and second-order effects based on the IPI point of view. Its analyses also contributes to targeting, IPB, and CPB.

Regional Cultural and Language Expertise. As the commander's primary resource for CMO and expertise of the civil component of the commander's battlespace, CA forces provide

operationally relevant knowledge of regional and local culture and language(s) which affects the MAGTF commander's situational awareness. Civil affairs forces are not translators or interpreters, but provide insight on culturally significant concepts, words, or phrases, that evoke social and political cooperation or division. Their civil focus identifies both opportunities and risks to mission success. Upon receipt of the mission, forward leaning commanders will direct their planning CA forces to initiate a CA running estimate and CPB to increase understanding of the social, economic, and political nuances in the commander's battlespace.

Liaison and Cross Coordination with Government, Non-Government, and International Organizations. Civil affairs forces serve as the bridge between military and civilian organizations to deconflict and support mutually benefiting activities. During decisive operations and the initial transition to stability operations, CA forces become the central point of contact and bridge for both the military and IPI and non-government and international organizations.

Civil affairs and CMO designated forces do not work for or have the authority to direct the operations of civil organizations. Due to the risks and political nature of US military support to civilian humanitarian aid agencies and organizations, including to USG agencies, requests for direct military assistance require notification and further coordination.

Civil-Military Operations Center. Civil-military operations centers are purpose-established forward operating centers to facilitate interaction between military forces, including unified action partners, and civil stakeholders such as IPI, non-governmental and international organizations, HN, USG departments and agencies, and other civil organizations in the commander's battlespace. A CMOC is scalable and can be tailored to the operation; its location, size and activities will vary with the degree of the security of the environment. A permissive environment allows a permanent structure with a robust staff to operate safely within a populated area with minimal security, while a CMOC supporting decisive operations may operate for only a few hours out of a vehicle once a week with appropriate security.

In addition to providing oversight of CMO and CAO activities on the ground, major activities of the CMOC include serving as a meeting place for military and civil stakeholders; source of vetted information for field-based USG departments and agencies; clearing house for civil requests for military assistance and point of contact for the local populace to bring issues to the military's attention.

Civil-military operations activities, plans, analyses, and recommendations are reported at least daily to the G-9, G-3/S-3, the CMO fire support watch officer, CIM/knowledge manager and others as directed, to provide the commander with the most current snapshot of the civil component in their operational area.

Civil Information Management. The Marine Civil Information Management System, also known as MARCIMS, is the knowledge management program of record for Marine CA. The MARCIMS suite of applications and hardware enables users to import, consolidate, organize, analyze, visualize, synthesize and share collected data to support CMO and other information capabilities. The MARCIMS input equipment includes handhelds that are typically resident at


the MIG, but the cloud-based information is easily accessible by permission and password to MAGTF staff and can be shared with appropriate military and civilian organizations.

CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT

Most Active Component CA Marines are directly assigned to Marine Corps unit staffs as CMO and CAO planners with some small CAT capabilities. If required for mission or operational requirements, MEFs request Reserve Component CA forces. The majority of CA Marines are Reservists assigned to Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES). Reserve Component CA forces are requested by the MEF or MIG from MARFORRES through Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM). The CAGs have a habitual relationship with one or more MEF and shares a corresponding regional orientation to enhance continuity and unity of action:

- 1st CAG located at Camp Pendleton, California, typically supports I MEF, and is regionally aligned with Marine Forces Pacific.
- 3rd CAG located at Great Lakes Naval Station, Great Lakes, Illinois, typically supports III MEF, and is also regionally aligned with MARFORPAC. 1st CAG and 3rd CAG often support the same operations.
- 4th CAG located at Hialeah, Florida, primarily supports II MEF. II MEF regularly provides forces for exercises and operations in United States Africa Command, United States European Command, Marine Corps Forces Southern Command, and Marine Corps Special Operations Command. 4th CAG replaces the deactivated 2nd CAG which had been located near Washington, D.C.

While assigned to FMF, CAGs are task organized to support the traditional MAGTF structure. Doctrinal templates provide a necessary starting point for Joint and Service strategic planners to resource personnel and materiel. Upon receipt of the mission, however, the MAGTF commander will task-organize CA Marines to best achieve operational objectives. Figure 2-2 depicts force employment of United States Marine Corps (USMC) CA forces.




- SP MAGTF
 - CMO Planner = 1 x 1708/1735/1739/1795
- Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or Battalion
 - CA Team = 4 Marines
- Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) or Regimental Combat Team (RCT)
 - Det = 13 Marines
- Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).
 - MEF is supported by one CAG (120 Marines)

Figure 2-2. USMC Civil Affairs Force Employment.

Civil affairs Marines should participate in the initial planning process and accompany the initial wave. Entry operations in Central Asia, Europe, Middle East, and the Pacific have consistently demonstrated that dedicated personnel to coordinate and resolve friction with IPI and other civil actors in the battlespace are critical to facilitate the MAGTF commander's immediate operations.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

Military government is the supreme authority the military exercises by force or agreement over the lands, property, and IPI of domestic, allied, or enemy territory, substituting sovereign authority under rule of law for the previously established government. Figure 2-3 depicts USMC military government operations across the competition continuum.



Legend

- JRSOI joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
- TMA transitional military authority

Figure 2-3. Military Government Operations Across the Competition Continuum.

When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to intervene militarily. For the joint force land component commander and staff, this may mean planning and executing joint land operations within an environment of political ambiguity. When a joint force performs a forcible entry (seize the initiative), defeating the enemy force, consequently deposing the indigenous government, and subsequently performing a military occupation (dominate), the land component must establish civil control (stabilize) by implementing PRC measures through the assertion of transitional military authority or establishment of military government until transition to a civil government (enabling civil authority). This progression is in synch with the joint phasing model and consistent with the achieving of unity of effort. Military government operations include transitional military operations and support to civil administration.

TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY

Transitional military authority is defined as a temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. Transitional military authority is established in foreign nations after cessation of major decisive action when directed in support of DOS operations or in the absence of other USG capabilities. Civil affairs forces may support the re-establishment of local government capability or enhance its capacity with the goal of a legitimate and effective civilian government. Like the commander's responsibility to conduct CMO, all intervening military forces have a legal and moral responsibility to install a temporary or transitional authority on behalf of the population in their area of responsibility (AOR) to ensure a minimum level of security and public services. An example of transitional military authority is tactical Marine units performing as political, judicial, or public facilities officials in their AO when the IPI ability to govern has failed or been removed.

All CA Marines can assess local conditions, identify vulnerabilities and destabilizing factors in government operations, and prioritize appropriate activities to mitigate them. They may have opportunities to take the lead to set conditions for the stability sectors by engaging with local government officials and coordinating with non-governmental and international organizations to facilitate their efforts to restore governmental functions. Reserve Component CA forces often possess relevant civilian professional skills that can be used to support transitional military authority activities that advance the local government's return to normal functioning.

SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Support to civil authorities is assistance given by US armed forces to stabilize or enhance the operations of the governing body of a foreign country by assisting an established or interim government to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, or recover from crisis; or support a reconstructed government in the aftermath of war. Civil affairs forces conduct SCA throughout the competition continuum. A key difference between SCA and transitional military authority is that in SCA, military forces engage with IPI and other civilian organizations to support and enable a functioning civilian government, as opposed to transitional military authority where military forces assume the essential functions of an absent or failed civilian government.

Across the competition spectrum CA support to SCA enables the commander to:

- Sustain the tempo of offensive operations.
- Leverage gains from government supporting operations currently underway.
- Maintain continuity for follow-on forces and organizations to build upon.
- Free combat units for another mission or task.

Transitional military authority and SCA should be viewed as a form of battle handover where commanders set conditions forth or begin the transfer of government responsibility for their AO to civilian leaders.

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORTED ACTIVITIES

Civil affairs supported activities are activities where CA plays a significant role in planning, coordinating, or synchronizing, but is not the proponent or primary executor of those activities. Civil affairs supported activities are foreign assistance, FHA, PRC, and civil-military engagement (CME). These population-centric missions are typically a combination of core capabilities from across the Marines, and in conjunction with other DoD services and US agencies. Civil affairs Marines typically support these operations during the planning of transition operations where their relationships and deep knowledge of the civil component provides operational and tactical commanders with additional expertise to execute military operations with minimal impact by, or on, the civilian populace and institutions.

Foreign assistance and FHA activities fall within the realm of security cooperation (SC) and response contingencies short of declared war. Foreign assistance and FHA authorities are in accordance with Title 22 USC, within support to interagency and interagency agreements, and limited Title 10, USC, authorities relating to DODD 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief [FDR]*, and DODD 5530.3, *International Agreements*. Civil affairs forces are most familiar with these authorities and organizations. They can facilitate COAs to assist in the stabilization of the area of interest and enable the integration of populations and resources in support of the commander's mission and end states. Civil affairs also enable the synchronization of unified action partners, IPI, and interagency groups, and provides context from a military standpoint to the civil authorities that are responsible to deliver or oversee the conduct of these operations.

Foreign Assistance

Foreign assistance is civil or military assistance rendered to foreign nations. Assistance ranges from the sale of military equipment and support for foreign internal defense (FID), to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural or manmade disasters. The focus of foreign assistance is to legitimize and enhance the stability of HN and IPI political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems. Civil affairs support to foreign assistance may include technical expertise, advice, and assistance that can significantly increase the success of other ongoing programs and initiatives to meet the needs of the populace and promote their sustainable development or growth. Foreign assistance activities include development assistance programs, humanitarian and civic assistance programs, and security assistance programs.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Foreign humanitarian assistance consists of the DoD activities conducted outside the US and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Foreign humanitarian assistance is a unique DoD term. Outside of the DoD the term for these activities is humanitarian assistance (HA) and foreign disaster relief (FDR). Foreign humanitarian assistance operations differ from foreign assistance primarily because FHA meets immediate humanitarian needs. The primary CA role in FHA is to assist the commander in planning. Civil affairs identify risks, provides COAs and initiates appropriate activities including activities in coordination with unified action partners, IPI, and interagency groups to synchronize humanitarian response efforts. Civil affairs forces often play a key role in conducting post-event assessments. Foreign humanitarian assistance activities fall into two broad categories:

- Steady-state FHA are activities usually planned and conducted as part of a theater campaign plan. The intent of steady-state FHA activities is to assess and increase the affected nation's capacity and capability to respond to disaster.
- Foreign disaster relief activities support limited duration contingency operations. The goal of FDR is to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims, including victims of natural disasters and conflicts, internally displaced persons, refugees, stateless persons, and vulnerable migrants. Foreign humanitarian assistance is usually directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at the tactical level.

The CA role also includes participation in interagency assessment, planning, and synchronizing of FHA activities to ensure the commander meets their legal and moral obligations in accordance with the judge advocate general to:

- Identify, validate, or evaluate HN and international resources available for FHA activities.
- Advise, assist, and plan displaced civilian movement and control.
- Participate in the execution of selected FHA activities as directed.
- Provide liaison with IPI.
- Assist in the coordination of local labor.
- Assess requirements and support for the operation of a CMOC.
- Conduct and maintain an assessment of humanitarian issues in designated nations or regions.
- Identify shortfalls in host nation HA programs and resources.

Foreign humanitarian assistance is often conducted simultaneously and independent of other types of civil-military operations. Civil affairs forces must ensure the commander and staff is informed on each type of operation including its specific performance metrics and strategic end state.

Populace and Resources Control

Populace and resources control consists of two distinct but linked components, populace control and resources control. These components are usually the responsibility of and performed by indigenous civil governments. For practical and security reasons however, military forces employ PRC measures across the range of military operations to limit their effects on the populace and to reduce civilian interference with military operations.

Populace Control. The requirement to control and support the civilian population can easily overwhelm local capabilities. Populace control provides security for the populace, mobilizes human resources, denies enemy access to the population, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. It involves establishing public order and safety, securing borders, population centers, and individuals. International law requires the military force to establish a safe, secure environment, to prevent unnecessary harm and address the immediate humanitarian needs of the populace in its AOR. Military forces provide the capability to secure borders, protect the population, and support IPI ability to hold individuals accountable for criminal

activities, control the activities of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablish essential civil services, and set conditions in the OE that will support follow-on stability activities.

The authority and extent of populace control measures that a commander may impose varies greatly with the type of mission and the OE. Civil affairs forces provide context of intangible factors such as the culture, perceptions, beliefs, and values of adversary, neutral, or friendly political and social systems that can affect military operations' success to enable commander's decision making. These factors must be continuously assessed throughout the operations process to maintain situational understanding of the environment.

Dislocated Civilians. A significant PRC activity is dislocated civilian (DC) operations. Dislocated civilian operations are actions required to move or keep civilians out of harm's way or to safeguard them in the aftermath of a disaster. The disaster may be natural (e.g., flood or an earthquake), manmade (e.g., combat operations, social, or political strife), or technological (e.g., a hazardous material or radiological disaster, cyber outage, or attack). Their movement and presence can hinder military operations, and they will likely require some degree of aid (e.g., medicine, food, shelter, and clothing). Dislocated civilian operations may occur during any phase across the range of military operations.

All DCs are civilians who have left their home of origin. They may not be indigenous to the area or to the country in which they reside. The term dislocated civilian is unique to the DoD. Dislocated civilian is not used by the DOS or NGOs. These organizations use the term internally displaced person for civilians displaced within their country and the term refugees for people who have fled their country of origin and crossed an international border. Civil affairs forces will be more effective using the term internally displaced person when working with DOS and NGOs. The following are recognized categories of DCs:

- Internally displaced persons (all persons outside of their home except refugees).
- Evacuees (temporarily relocated due to a crisis event).
- Displaced persons.
 - Returnees (persons that had left previously and have returned to their country of origin).
 - Resettled persons (persons resettled from another area or nation for their protection).
- Migrants (persons seeking opportunities outside of their region/place of origin).
- Refugees (persons who have left their country of origin due to a well-founded fear of death). Refugees have additional legal protection under the Geneva Conventions. As a result, DCs and refugees should not be collocated in the same physical space.

The HN always has primary responsibility for the protection and care of its populace. When the HN's capabilities are exceeded, the HN often requests assistance from and partners with international organizations including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). These organizations provide immediate assistance to the HN to meet the basic needs of DCs, such as food, water, shelter, sanitation, and security and have special status under international law. These agencies also monitor for signs of communicable disease

among DCs and take action to stop them before they can spread into the populace. This last point is important for the health of military forces as well.

The primary CA supporting task in DC operations is facilitating the commander's freedom of movement while safeguarding the civilian population. Civil affairs forces activities in support of DC operations include:

- Identifying or evaluating existing HN and international community DC plans and operations.
- Advising on DC control measures that would more effectively support the military operation.
- Advising on how to implement DC control measures.
- Publicizing control measures among the IPI.
- Assessing MOEs.
- Participating in the execution of selected DC operations as needed or directed and in coordination with the internationally mandated organizations (i.e., UNHCR, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and the ICRC).
- Assisting in arbitration of problems arising from implementation of DC control measures.
- Conducting civil information management to identify DC locations and composition.

Resources Control. Resources control directly affects the economic system of an HN or territory occupied and governed by US forces. Resources control provides security for the natural and manmade material resources of a nation; mobilizes economic resources, denies enemy access to natural and economic resources, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents and criminal entities. Resource control measures regulate public and private property and the production, movement, or consumption of material resources. Resources control measures include, but are not limited to licensing, regulations or guidelines, border security, checkpoints, customs inspections, ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.

Controlling a nation's resources is the responsibility of the HN government. During a civil or military crisis, HN government authorities will continue to define, enact, and enforce resource control measures to maintain public order and enable security; restore essential services and infrastructure, and to enable commerce activities.

Note: United States forces will not execute these measures unless the requirements are clearly beyond the capabilities of the HN, the HN has requested assistance, and the appropriate US authorities (to include the US Ambassador) have granted approval for such assistance.

Resources control includes property control, which is the control of movable and immovable private and public property. Civil affairs support to resource control measures may include:

- Establishing procedures to resolve property rights for land and subterranean resources.
- Implementing mechanisms to prevent unauthorized seizures of land or property.
- Securing existing harvest storage facilities to prevent spoilage and looting of harvested crops.

- Implementing rationing and distribution programs for key commodities (e.g., food and fuel).
- Establishing border security, including customs procedures to prevent arms smuggling and human trafficking, and stop contraband, such as drugs and natural resources from entering the HN and AOR.
- Regulating and securing access to valuable natural resources.
- Identifying and reporting illicit trade in natural resources and developing governance mechanisms and incentives to bring trade into the market.
- Initiating processes for addressing and resolving resource ownership and access issues.
- Freezing financial accounts of enemy combatants.
- Locking international access of overseas financial accounts to prevent money laundering.
- Protecting and securing strategically important institutions.

Civil affairs forces should advise that control measures must be the least restrictive measures necessary and be equitably enforced to achieve the desired effect. Effectively implementing resources control requires the HN government or transitional military government to inform the populace of the measures to be imposed and the justification for the action. Civil affairs support public information externally through their relationships with IPI, NGOs and international organizations and internally through MISO and COMMSTRAT units for parallel activities. Civil affairs will continually assess the effectiveness of operational environment restriction measures, the attitude of the population toward the government and military forces, and the impact the restrictions have on the operational environment. As the security situation improves, CA may advise where and when restrictions can be modified, reduced, or rescinded.

CHAPTER 3

COORDINATION WITH

INTERORGANIZATIONAL COUNTERPARTS

Successful CMO requires effective coordination. Effective coordination requires fostering relationships and building rapport with civilian counterparts. Civil-military operations require a fundamental understanding of the functions of their civilian counterparts but more importantly effective coordination and communication. The MAGTF must master those skills and coordination methods. This includes gaining an understanding and appreciation of the cultural differences of civilian counterparts. Civilian counterparts may include the host nation, Ios, NGOs, private industry, and the interagency and will likely be on the ground before the arrival of the MAGTF.

Many civilian organizations and agencies have unique skills, resources, and experiences that can contribute to common goals or end states. It is imperative to look for these complementary skills and knowledge and foster vital links with economic, political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and informational entities pertinent to the operation.

During the decades of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the international community found itself in two protracted land-based complex operations; operations that required a robust presence of both the USG and other partner nations. These operations have called for the interface of the MAGTF and civilians such as the integration of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). This chapter focuses on civilian partners with whom the MAGTF may engage in civil-military operations.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (THE INTERAGENCY)

The interagency refers to USG agencies and departments, including the DoD. The discussion in this chapter will focus more on details that highlight how to work effectively with these organizations. The following USG agencies are the most likely partners during the conduct of CMO. For more systematic oversight and informational details on these and other USG agencies with which DoD has frequent interactions, refer to Annexes in Appendix A of JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*.

United States Department of State

The US DOS is the USG agency responsible for planning and implementing the foreign policy of the United States. The DOS leads and coordinates US interagency participation that includes not only the US, but also the host nation, other nations, Ios, cooperating nongovernmental organizations, and other participants. In most cases primary coordination occurs with the country team. Major responsibilities include oversight of official US representation abroad, managing foreign assistance and foreign military training programs, countering international crime, and providing an array of services to US citizens as well as foreign nationals seeking entrance to the US.

The DOS is divided into offices and bureaus that are either functional or regional (similar to the way combatant commands are organized.). Within a usual embassy overseas, the DOS's principal relationship with DoD is to ensure that defense activities support national foreign policy and to facilitate defense activities overseas. In its role as facilitator of defense activities overseas, DOS approaches foreign governments through high-level visits, or contact with foreign government representatives in the US to negotiate agreements or obtain authorization for defense activities in the sovereign territory of the foreign country.

Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration provides aid and sustainable solutions for refugees, victims of conflict and stateless people around the world, through repatriation, local integration, and resettlement in the US. There may be a Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration officer assigned to the US embassy. The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration officer will oversee resettlement and issues that affect migration within the HN. They will likely interface with international organizations such as UNHCR and International Organization for Migration and may in some cases fund these international organizations. It is important to note that the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration is the lead agency with regards to refugee populations and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes the lead with internally displaced populations.

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. In recognition of the impact that DoD activities have on US foreign affairs, DOS has assigned a single bureau, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, to be its primary interface with the DoD. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs manages political military relations throughout the world, including training and assistance for foreign militaries, and works to maintain global access for US military forces. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs promotes responsible US defense trade, while controlling foreign access to military technology through export controls. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs also coordinates US programs that help rid countries of landmines and other conventional weapons. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs helps protect national security by leading interagency efforts to plan for future crises—including planning US responses to cyberspace-attacks against vital computer networks or to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks overseas.

Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations supports the DOS's conflict and crisis-response efforts through locally grounded analysis, strategic planning, and operational support for local partners. The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations was formerly known as the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations provides overseas assistance through conflict analysis, strategic planning, and SME support. The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations helps develop prioritized strategies that target the causes of instability and address high-risk periods such as elections or political transitions. They also assist the USG and HN with plans focusing on local initiatives to connect media, community leaders, technical experts, and under-represented groups.

United States Agency for International Development

The USAID provides and manages US foreign economic and humanitarian assistance programs around the world. United States Agency for International Development is an independent federal

government agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. The USAID is sometimes mistakenly seen as an integral part of DOS. The USAID is the development arm of the USG, whereas the DOS is the policy and diplomatic arm. In general, USAID prefers to be seen as distinct and separate from their DOS counterparts. United States Agency for International Development offices are often separate from the US embassy and known as the USAID “mission”, not to be confused with the US mission which is another way to refer to the US embassy. United States Agency for International Development objectives are ordinarily promulgated in the form of a Country Development Cooperation Strategy.

The USAID implements programs in five functional areas:

- Environment.
- Population and health.
- Democracy.
- Economic growth.
- Humanitarian assistance and support for post-crisis transitions.

Most of USAID is dedicated to long-term development. This contrasts with the offices that focus on post-crisis and humanitarian assistance. These latter offices fall into the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance. The MAGTF will most likely interface with staff members from the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance.

The USAID is divided into functional and regional bureaus and offices, like DOS. United States Agency for International Development employees are either technical SMEs (as reflected in the five programming areas) or provide administrative support. The agency does not implement programs or projects. It hires implementing partners to perform these tasks.

The USAID provides funding and oversight for programs but does not execute projects in the field; rather USAID hires implementing partners to manage USAID-sponsored projects in foreign countries. Most of the implementing partners are either US-based NGOs or for-profit companies and consulting firms that provide technical expertise and high-level consultants. Most CMO interface with USAID will likely be undertaken with the offices that are nested in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance.

Office of Transition Initiatives. The Office of Transition Initiatives works in select conflict-prone countries to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs. The Office of Transitional Initiatives’ programs are often initiated in fragile states that have not reached the stability needed to initiate longer-term development programs. The Office of Transition Initiatives is funded by a separate transition initiatives budget account with special authorities that allow immediate spending where it is most needed.

For example, following the 2010 uprising in Kyrgyzstan, the Office of Transition Initiatives initiated a program that included regionally based programming focused on national and local sources of ethnic conflict and instability. This type of programming contrasts with long-term assistance that focuses on sustainable and usually country-wide strategies such as the improvement of business, health care, and education.

Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance. The Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance is responsible for leading and coordinating the USG's response to disasters overseas. The Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance responds to disasters to ensure aid reaches people affected by rapid on-set disasters, such as earthquakes, volcanoes, and floods, and slow-onset crises, including drought and conflict or a combination of both. The Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance will usually dispatch a disaster assistance response team, which varies in size depending on the nature of the disaster.

The Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance provides emergency food assistance to those affected by conflict and natural disasters. It also provides development food assistance to address the underlying causes of hunger. The Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance's emergency programs are the most visible form of humanitarian assistance. Emergency food aid programs main functions are to maintain or improve the nutritional status of vulnerable groups to save lives, reduce suffering, and lessen the impact of shocks on overall food security.

During an emergency response, the Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance uses in-kind food aid, such as locally or regionally procured food, cash transfers, or food vouchers to ensure communities have access to food. The type of response depends on conditions on the ground and what the best tools are for reaching people as quickly as possible for maximum impact. Sometimes, food for work programs are employed to improve nutritional status and fund short-term projects, such as infrastructure repairs in post-disaster situations.

Office of Civil-Military Cooperation. The Office of Civil-Military Cooperation (formerly the Office for Military Affairs), manages and facilitates USAID's day-to-day interface with DoD, including coordination on policy, planning, training, exercises, and communications. It provides USAID input to DoD policy and planning guidance, directives and instructions, military doctrine, joint publications, and handbooks. Additionally, the Office of Civil-Military Cooperation produces familiarization courses on working with the military for USAID personnel and on the objectives and structure of both DoD and USAID.

United States Department of Agriculture

Within the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), most day-to-day international programs and personnel are administered by the Foreign Agricultural Service. The Foreign Agricultural Service sends agricultural counselors and attachés to work in US embassies throughout the world. Foreign Agricultural Service counselors and attachés work with the members of the country team. Their primary focus is to advise and give technical expertise on issues, such as market access, food aid, capacity building, and biotechnology. In other circumstances, such as the recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, USDA may assign employees to provide more field-level technical expertise at a PRT. However, more times than not they will work at the embassy level with HN government counterparts.

Additionally, USAID may also employ agriculture SMEs who provide oversight for USAID agriculture programs in developing countries. These SMEs provide program and project oversight and employ implementing partners to carry out the programs. In contrast, the USDA provides SMEs and agricultural attachés that work at the national level with the HN agricultural ministry.

United States Department of Justice

The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) is a large department with many overseas programs ranging from drug enforcement to providing experts in many areas of the rule of law. Much in the way USDA provides agriculture expertise, DOJ may assign its employees to work in embassies or directly for a DOS funded program. These SMEs will most likely work with the HN ministry of justice or interior.

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) employees are assigned to work with foreign government officials. They assist host government departments and staff to develop professional and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism. The ICITAP supports both national security and foreign policy objectives.

Department of State, USAID, and DoD all fund ICITAP programs that span the globe from Mexico to Algeria and the Philippines. Programming includes providing SMEs in areas of terrorism and trans-national crime, marine and border security, criminal investigations, forensics, community policing, and criminal justice coordination.

Drug Enforcement Administration

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the primary narcotics enforcement agency for the USG. The DEA's mission is to enforce the controlled substance laws and regulations of the US and bring to the criminal and civil justice system of the US, or any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and principal members of organizations, involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the US; and to recommend and support non-enforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of Illicit controlled substances on the domestic and international markets.

The DEA may be involved in crop eradication, crop substitution, and training of foreign officials. They are responsible, under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State and US ambassadors, for all programs associated with drug law enforcement counterparts in foreign countries. Drug Enforcement Administration investigations are becoming increasingly complex and frequently require more sophisticated investigative techniques, such as electronic surveillance.

Rule of Law Programming

Rule of law programming is defined as assistance to support legal, judicial, and law enforcement reform efforts undertaken by foreign governments. Due to the fundamental nature of the functional areas germane to DOJ, it is a logical primary resource for rule of law SMEs. This assistance is divided into four or five main sectors: judicial and court systems (including civil and criminal), law enforcement (police), penal systems and lastly, legislative systems that make the laws. Sometimes civil society is also included as an additional category.

This assistance will take the form of construction of buildings, such as police stations or courthouses, training programs for judges, lawyers, administrators, corrections, and police officers.

The DOJ provides lawyers, DEA agents, and other law enforcement personnel (often via ICITAP) to work on rule of law programs overseas. These programs may be funded by DOS or their own internal funds.

While there is some overlap, the requirements for training a civilian police force differ from those of training a national military. The military is trained in a set of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) aimed at providing point security. Police provide a very different type of civil security—“serve and protect”—therefore, DOJ is better suited for training civilian police forces.

UNITED STATES EMBASSY

A US embassy, also referred to as a mission, is responsible for the conduct of bilateral diplomacy with foreign governments. An embassy is headed by an ambassador, also known as the chief of mission (COM).

Ambassador

The ambassador is a presidential appointee and the President’s personal representative overseas. The ambassador is the senior US official in the country. By law, ambassadors coordinate, direct, and supervise all USG activities and representatives posted in the foreign country to which they are accredited. Ambassadors do not exercise control of US personnel attached to and working for the head of a US mission to an international organization (e.g., US ambassador to North Atlantic Treaty Organization or any US or United Nation [UN] staff) or US military personnel operating under the command of a combatant commander (CCDR). Generally, each ambassador has an agreement with the CCDR identifying DoD personnel for whom they are responsible. A common misunderstanding about ambassadors is that although appointed by the President, they report directly to the Secretary of State, not to the President.

United States Country Team

The US country team is the senior interagency coordinating body and the core of embassy operational decision making. The DOS uses the Integrated Country Strategies as the key document to define mission goals and objectives for diplomacy, development, and security within a country.

The senior defense official (SDO)/defense attaché (DATT) is the principal DoD official in a US embassy, as designated by the SecDef, and is the ambassador’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues. The SDO/DATT is the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military officer assigned to a US diplomatic mission. All DoD elements assigned or attached to US embassies are aligned under coordinating authority of the SDO/DATT. Where separate SDO and DATT offices exist, they remain separate with distinct duties and statutory authorities. The SDO/DATT also serves as the single point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy, to include elements assigned to or working from a given embassy. The Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) falls under the SDO/DATT and is responsible for all security cooperation and security assistance functions within the HN. The SCO works both for the SDO/DATT and by extension the ambassador, as well as the CCDR.

Individual elements of the country team will also be working daily with their military counterparts and reporting updates to the country team. This can create tensions regarding who is the final authority. The DoD may also have liaison officers, defense attachés, security assistance officials, or civil-military support elements assigned to the country team who are under the ambassador's authority, independent of CCMDs.

Political Advisor

Political advisors (POLADs) are senior DOS officers (flag-rank equivalent) detailed as personal advisors to leading US military leaders and commanders to provide policy support regarding the diplomatic and political aspects of the commanders' military responsibilities. Critical differences exist between the ways DoD and DOS personnel approach most areas of their professional existence. From organization to hierarchy, training and education, forms of address, specific protocol, etc., part of the POLAD's job is to bridge the gap between these differences. Their roles are expanding because of increased intermingling of interagency partners and the onset of the 3Ds: diplomacy, defense, and development.

The POLAD can be of great assistance in interagency coordination. Political advisors are usually assigned to JTF commanders and geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) to whom they are directly responsible. Political advisors provide USG foreign policy perspectives and diplomatic considerations and establish linkages with US embassies in the AOR or joint operational area.

Regional Security Officer

The regional security officer (RSO) is responsible for protecting the US embassy (or consulate), its personnel, and information. The RSO serves as the US embassy's law enforcement liaison to the HN and arranges training for foreign police and security officers to combat terrorism. It also advises Americans about safety and security abroad and assists US related schools and organizations in obtaining security grants. American embassies and consulates overseas are a frequent target of terrorists and other criminals. The RSO develops, implements, and manages a range of physical, cyber, and personnel security to mitigate threats. Marine security guards fall under the authority of the RSO.

Emergency Action Committee

The emergency action committee (EAC) is an advisory body within the US embassy that assists in preparing for and responding to threats, emergencies, and other crises (such as NEOs) in the country. The EAC develops its post-specific emergency action plan.

Mission Disaster Relief Officer

The mission disaster relief officer is the focal point for disaster-related information, planning, and response activities relevant to the HN and is appointed by the Ambassador. This assignment is usually an additional duty to the officer's main function in the embassy. The mission disaster relief officer is a member of the post's EAC and is responsible for preparing Appendix J of the Emergency Action Plan, entitled Assistance to Host Country in a Major Accident or Disaster, usually referred to as the Mission Disaster Relief Plan. The mission disaster relief officer is familiar with HN disaster authorities and capabilities and other potential humanitarian partners. The mission disaster relief officer also continually liaises with the USAID/Office of United

States Foreign Disaster Assistance regional advisor, DoD staff on the country team, and the DOS's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.

The mission disaster relief officer is responsible for disaster related issues affecting the host population; however, the mission disaster relief officer should notify the chief of the consular section as soon as possible after a disaster occurs. The consular section is responsible for ascertaining the welfare of American citizens who may be affected by the disaster and for warning Americans not to travel to the disaster zone. After a disaster has been declared, the mission disaster relief officer is responsible for drafting the disaster declaration cable and submitting it to the ambassador for approval, sharing information about the welfare and whereabouts of American citizens in the HN with the post's consular section, and maintaining regular contact with relevant organizations (e.g., UN, donor countries, NGOs, international organizations).

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Many NGOs are private, self-governing, not-for-profit organizations dedicated to alleviating human suffering. Nongovernmental organizations can be categorized into the following general areas:

- Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
- Development.
- Human rights.
- Civil society.
- Conflict resolution.

Nongovernmental organizations are frequently in country before the US military, and many are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They often have a long-term and well-established presence in the areas where they work as well as the trust of the local population. Additionally, they will most likely remain long after military forces have departed.

Nongovernmental organizations range in size and experience from those with multi-million-dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to small organizations or charities newly formed to respond to a particular emergency or disaster.

In conflict areas, NGOs derive security and access from their neutrality, impartiality, and humanitarian focus. The extent to which specific NGOs are willing to cooperate with the military will be varied as a result.

Nongovernmental organizations may be funded by private donors, international organizations, and government agencies or departments or a combination of all the above. They consider themselves neutral, impartial, and unbiased. However, they are accountable to their various donors for their resources and thus must follow the guidelines and policies sometimes set forth by those donors.

Additionally, NGOs can provide an improved understanding of the operating environment for the military and potentially enable them to better foster amicable relations with the local population. This is especially true in the process of civil preparation of the battlespace (CPB) where civil information is collected and analyzed in support of planning and execution.

UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs does not execute programs. Rather it serves as the overarching coordination mechanism for the rest of the UN operational agencies mobilizing international assistance when the scale of the disaster exceeds the national capacity. The UN humanitarian coordinator has overall responsibility for ensuring coherence of relief efforts in the field. The following are the major operational UN organizations that contribute to disaster response. Their titles are indicative of their focal area.

Failure to understand the humanitarian community or unwillingness to coordinate with these organizations may lead to a redundancy of effort and a waste of resources. This subsequent section identifies the coordination mechanisms used in international humanitarian responses.

UN CLUSTER SYSTEM FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

The Cluster System (see Figure 3-1) is a UN coordination mechanism designed for international responses to humanitarian crises. The aim of the cluster approach is to strengthen partnerships and ensure more predictability and accountability in international responses to humanitarian emergencies, by clarifying the division of labor among organizations, and better defining their roles and responsibilities within the key sectors of the response. There are nine functional clusters for coordination at both the field (tactical) and global (strategic) levels, with each field-level cluster led by an agency accountable to the UN humanitarian coordinator. The nine clusters, together with their lead agencies, are:

- Nutrition (UNICEF).
- Health (World Health Organization).
- Water/sanitation (UNICEF).
- Emergency shelter (UNHCR/International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).
- Camp coordination/management (UNHCR/International Organization for Migration).
- Protection (UNHCR/UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights/UNICEF).
- Early recovery (UN Development Programme).
- Logistics (UN World Food Programme).
- Emergency Telecommunications (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs/UNICEF/ World Food Programme).




Figure 3-1. United Nations Cluster System.

Legend

- FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
- UNDP United Nations Development Programme
- WFP United Nations World Food Programme
- WHO United Nations World Health Organization

INTERAGENCY PLANNING MECHANISMS

It is important to understand several precepts when addressing interagency planning in the civilian world. The Department of State, DoD, and USAID each divide the world up differently, so GCCs may not overlap or be regionally aligned. Some planning focuses on policy and stakeholder actions. Sometimes the planning process is divided by function or geographic region. The DOS implemented new guidance and direction to change the previous top-down and resource driven approaches to planning. Based off the Joint Strategic Plan and the Quadrennial

Diplomacy and Development Review released by DOS and USAID, regional bureaus are responsible to create joint regional strategies, which in turn are used by each mission to create an integrated country strategy and submit their mission resource request.

Department of State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan

The DOS/USAID Joint Strategic Plan is the single, highest-level strategic outline for DOS and USAID. It forms the basis for more detailed planning and budgeting on international affairs policies, programs, and resources in the years ahead. The Joint Strategic Plan outlines high-level foreign policy goals and strategies shared by both organizations and are produced every four years. Some key components of the Joint Strategic Plan are:

- Mission statement.
- Agency-wide long-term goals and objectives for all major functions and operations (strategic goal framework).
- Regional priorities.
- Program evaluation tools and methods.

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review

Quadrennial diplomacy and development reviews are country-level strategy, budget allocation and request, and performance assessment documents. They identify US foreign policy priorities for each country over the next three to five years; describe the strategies to achieve them; identify and request foreign assistance and State operations resources needed; and measure progress by setting performance targets and reporting against them. The quadrennial diplomacy and development review is the first step in the DOS and USAID annual budget formulation process. Quadrennial diplomacy and development reviews are posted on classified Intellipedia.

United States Agency for International Development Planning

United States Agency for International Development planning depends on its country level missions and forward-deployed American and local staff for assessment, planning, and implementation of most of its programs. Because development programming is tailored to the needs and challenges faced in each country, USAID missions are empowered to develop strategic plans called country development cooperation strategy. This planning model was implemented as a pilot in 2010 and currently includes all countries. The country development cooperation strategy is designed to synthesize country-specific development challenges (poverty, corruption, human immunodeficiency virus, etc.). The country development cooperation strategy lays out the USG objectives and approaches for achieving those objectives. Importantly, these strategies are reflective of the development agenda of the HN itself and work to align US, HN, and international and bilateral donor programs also working in the country.

INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS

Requests for US military assistance are initiated with a mission tasking matrix (MITAM). A helpful reference is the USAID/BHA Emergency Application Guidelines –FY 2022. This document is issued to all US embassies worldwide and gives in-depth guidance and information on disaster response. There are several coordinating mechanisms that are used in disaster response. The three main mechanisms are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Humanitarian Operations Center

The humanitarian operations center (HOC) is a senior level international and interagency coordinating body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large FHA operation. It is usually established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the UN, or a USG agency during a US unilateral operation. Because the HOC operates at the national level, it will usually consist of senior representatives from the affected country, assisting countries, the UN, NGOs, international organizations, and other major organizations in the operation. United States participation should include the ambassador (leading the US representation), USAID representatives, and representatives from the joint force. The HOC is horizontally structured with no command and control authority and all members are ultimately responsible to their own organizations or countries.

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center

A humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC) is used to coordinate initial contingency planning and interagency coordination. Usually, the HACC is temporary. Once a CMOC or HOC has been established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the combatant command's staff and crisis action organization.

Civil-Military Operations Center

The CMOC provides tactical or operational level coordination between the JFC and other stakeholders. The JFC may establish a CMOC to coordinate and facilitate US and multinational forces' humanitarian operations with those of international and local relief agencies and HN agencies and authorities. The CMOC serves as the primary collaboration interface for the joint force among HN, international organizations, NGOs, multinational military forces, the private sector, and the interagency. Military forces, depending on the needs of the operation, may co-locate in a civilian-run or established center.

The CMOC does not set policy or direct operations. It is a coordination mechanism for stakeholders and may be physical or virtual. The organization of the CMOC is theater and mission dependent, flexible in size and composition. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC. More than one CMOC may be established in an operational area, and each is task-organized based on the mission.

The CMOC, HACC, and HOC are distinct but interrelated organizations. The relationship among these organizations and interagency, international, and HN structures can be complex and challenging. It should not be assumed that the CMOC will be the main coordinating center for the operation.

There is a significant difference between the HOC and CMOC. The CMOC is established by and works for the commander. The HOC is usually established under the direction of the HN government, the UN, or Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance during a US unilateral operation. The HOC operates at senior, national level to coordinate strategic and operational unity of effort, while the CMOC works at the local level coordinating US actions to achieve operational and tactical unity of effort.

CHAPTER 4

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Planning is an essential element of command and control within maneuver warfare. It ensures the commander, staff, and subordinate elements establish a shared understanding of the operating environment and the desired outcome or end state of an operation. This enables the commander to make informed and timely decisions that out tempo the adversary's decision cycle and are fully understood by the staff and subordinate commanders in execution. The theory that drives Marine Corps planning is fully described in MCDP 5 *Planning*, and the process by which MAGTF staffs conduct planning is laid out in MCWP 5-10 *Marine Corps Planning Process*. Civil military operations planning is fully described in MCRP 3-02A.2 *CMO Planning*. This section broadly describes the purpose, functions, and outputs of CMO planning in support of MAGTF operations and the role a CMO planner performs within a MAGTF staff and operational planning team.

The Marine Corps Planning Process is a six-step process employed by a commander through their staff and is underpinned by three tenets. The three tenets to the Marine Corps Planning Process are:

- Top-down/commander driven.
- Integrated planning.
- Single-battle concept.

These tenets drive horizontal and vertical staff integration, as well as concurrent planning. The single battle concept ensures all actions in the OE align to achieve the commander's desired end state, whereas integrated planning ensures all warfighting functions, major subordinate elements and attachments are included in planning. Ultimately though, the commander drives the planning process from the top, but is informed through bottom-up refinement. The CMO planner provides analysis and insight into the civil considerations of the OE for the staff and OPT. This insight ensures that civil considerations are both incorporated into the operational design as well as detailed staff actions.

The principal analysis provided by the CMO planner is through the Civil Preparation of the Battlespace (CPB) (Appendix A). This process aligns to the IPB process led by the G/S-2 and is complementary in many ways, though it contrasts with the IPB in that outputs of the CPB are informed by and should be shared with interorganizational partners. In fact, when available, interorganizational partners can provide invaluable input and feedback to the CPB. The CPB is a four-step process that:

1. Defines the civil operating environment.
2. Analyzes the civil operating environment.
3. Develops a civil environment model.

4. Determines civil actions.

Like the IPB, the CPB is an iterative process that precedes an OPT and should be a key inject into the first step in MCPP. The CMO planner will continually refine the CPB as more information becomes available, requests for information (RFIs) are answered, assumptions are confirmed or denied, and planning unfolds.

The MCPP is organized into six steps. Each step is built around design and staff actions. Design is principally developed through critical thinking and analysis between the core OPT and the commander but is informed by staff actions. The CMO planner provides critical input to both design and staff action but will spend most of their time on staff actions developing CMO planning support products necessary for each step of MCPP.

The six steps in the MCPP are:

1. Problem framing.
2. COA development.
3. COA wargaming.
4. COA comparison and decision.
5. Orders development.
6. Transition.

Each step of MCPP requires distinct actions from the CMO planner. For example, the CPB is a critical inject into problem framing, in particular the commander's orientation on the OE and problem set. The Civil Environment Model provides a framework for COA development informed by civil considerations. The Green Cell and Civil Actions (derived from the CPB) provide the wargame a realistic interaction with the civil dimension that will improve the COA. Finally, the CMO planning support products developed during each step are captured in the Annex G during Orders Development and briefed to the MAGTF in the transition step. An effective CMO planner provides value by knowing their role on the staff, the organization of the OPT, and staff integration functions. These will each be described in the following sections.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING DEFINED

Civil-military operations planning are those actions that provide analysis, insight, and planning support products – including the Annex G – related to the civil dimension of the OE to OPTs and staffs to support the commander's decision-making process. Civil-military operations planning specifically focuses on the impact of the civil dimension on MAGTF operations, and of MAGTF operations on the civil dimension within the OE. Civil-military operations planners are typically trained CA Marines, or at a minimum have attended the CMO planner's course. They provide a critical function to the OPT that ensures the commander fulfills their legal and moral obligations with regards to the civil dimension of the OE.

Civil-military operations planning can include key staff functions such as supervising the G-9, leading the CMO working group, producing CMO planning support products, establishing and supporting the Green Cell, coordinating with the Red Cell, and executing staff battle rhythm

events. The CMO planner leverages staff integration to ensure both horizontal and vertical integration of civil considerations across the MAGTF staff and with subordinate elements. Most importantly, the CMO planner develops the CMO concept of support and communicates that initially via the staff estimate and then the Annex G “Civil-Military Operations.” When the Annex G is taken into execution, the CMO planner can become the lead action officer that supports the commander’s decisions involving the civil dimension of the OE.

A unique responsibility of the CMO planner is integrating the MAGTF and other service CMO capabilities, with USG agencies, coalition, and foreign government elements (HN government, police, military), as well as international organizations and NGOs. These organizations will be present in the OE, and operate under a diverse set of authorities, motivations, and policies. The CMO planner must establish relationships with these organizations, and either build mechanisms for coordination, or coordinate within the established rhythms of these organizations.

Coordinating with interorganizational partners can provide significant value to MAGTF operations even though they operate outside of the military chain of command. This requires strong interpersonal communication skills for the CMO planner, as well as ensuring the MAGTF commander and staff understand the context within which interorganizational partners operate. Some considerations for effective cooperation might include classification and information management. For example, to what degree can the CPB be shared or socialized with interorganizational partners, or the degree of access these partners have to the commander and staff, and their willingness to participate in functions like the Green Cell. The CMO planner is responsible for integrating the civil dimension into the overall operational approach, as well as organizing the CMO planning effort to incorporate interorganizational partners.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING

The core planning organization is the OPT typically formed from within either the G-3 or G-5. It is a dynamic, task-organized planning team that develops future operations and plans by using the MCPP. The OPT integrates warfighting functions from across the MAGTF staff as well as, representatives from subordinate, adjacent, and higher organizations. External and internal SMEs can also be included within the scope of the planning effort. At a minimum, an OPT will include the OPT leader, a deputy, recorder, and planning representatives from the principal staff sections, as well as the major subordinate elements. Together the OPT will execute the MCPP to support the commander’s decision-making.

The CMO planner usually resides in the G/S-3, however at times a G-9 will be established for longer term counterinsurgency, stability, or related irregular warfare activities, and the CMO planner will reside there. The CMO planner is responsible to the OPT leader for forming and leading the civil-military operations working group (CMOWG), establishing a Green Cell, supporting the Red Cell, coordinating with interorganizational partners, exercising cognizance over civil affairs capabilities, producing CMO planning support products, developing the CMO concept of support, and writing the Annex G. Each staff section in the MAGTF will perform similar activities and functions, for example the G-2 will develop the IPB, which includes key planning support products like the modified combined obstacle overlay, physical network analysis, most likely and most dangerous adversary COAs, and initial intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance (ISR) plan, as well as the intelligence staff estimate. The G-3 will develop staff estimates for aviation, fires, and maneuver. The OPT leader will ensure these estimates are integrated across the planning team to maintain a shared understanding.

Civil-Military Operations Working Group

The CMOWG consists of CA staff personnel and SMEs (see Figure 4-1). The CMOWG plans concurrently with the MAGTF OPT and provides input as required. The composition and scope of the CMOWG varies according to the size of the MAGTF and level of interorganizational involvement. The CMOWG will be most effective when there is maximum participation with interorganizational partners. The CMOWG conducts CPB, develops the CMO problem statement, creates the CMO concept of support or concept of operations, develops the CMO staff estimate, and produces Annex G.




Figure 4-1. Example CMO Working Group.

The CMOWG relies on their CMO planner to:

- Gain understanding and insights into the planning conducted by the OPT.
- Advise the OPT about CA capabilities, limitations, and the civil environment.
- Provide the OPT with analysis, insight, and planning support products – including the Annex G – related to the civil dimension of the OE.
- Support the Green Cell and coordinate with the Red Cell.
- Execute staff battle rhythm events.
- Ensure integration of civil considerations across the MAGTF staff and with subordinate elements.
- Develop the CMO concept of support initially via the staff estimate and then the Annex G “Civil-Military Operations.”

Green Cell

The Green Cell is formed to assist the commander and OPT in emulating the behavior of the civil dimension. The cell is formed during problem framing, and coordinates both with the OPT and Red Cell throughout planning to provide a civil environment model (that includes most likely and most disruptive civil reactions) to the wargame.

Red Cell

The G-2 forms and exercises cognizance over the Red Cell whose purpose is to emulate the adversary during the COA wargame. Like the Green Cell, the Red Cell is formed during problem framing and is typically organized from the G-2 but can include SME's from across the warfighting functions. The CMO planner coordinates with the Red Cell to shape and understand potential civil reactions from the adversary's perspective. This analysis provides insight into how the civilian population will react to both friendly and adversary actions within the OE during the COA wargame.

Civil-Military Operations Working Group Subject Matter Experts

When possible, include SMEs in the planning effort such as:

- USAID/Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance.
- Host nation representation.
- Nongovernmental organization(s).
- Intergovernmental organization(s).
- Department of Agriculture.
- Medical Officer
- Veterinarian.
- Department of State.
- Foreign area officers and/or regional area officers.
- Chaplain.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS INPUTS TO THE MCPP

Planning activities within the MAGTF staff are organized through the MCPP and implemented via the OPT. The OPT receives inputs from across the staff through each step of MCPP, acts on those inputs, and produces results. Some results remain at the staff level, while others require the commander's approval to proceed to the next step. The CMO planner represents the civil dimension through each step of the planning process by providing injects, supporting the planning activities, and then reviewing the results from each step. In this section, the required inputs, activities, and results are identified in bold while all other actions remain in normal text.

Problem Framing

Problem framing provides the foundation to each following step in the MCPP. The CMO planner provides planning support products to the problem framing step related to the civil dimension (see Figure 4-2). The key outputs of problem framing are an approved commander's intent, mission statement, operational approach, and COA development guidance.

Problem framing is the first step in MCPP and consists of the commander-driven design process supported by staff actions. The purpose of problem framing is to gain an enhanced understanding of the OE and the nature of the problem set. This greater understanding of the OE allows a commander to visualize the operation and describe their broad operational approach. The CMO planner supports both design and staff action in problem framing. The civil dimension is a critical element to the OE and must drive critical discussions during the commander’s orientation. This discussion will inform key aspects of the problem set, and subsequently the commander’s initial intent and guidance.




Figure 4-2 CMO Support to the Problem Framing Step.

Defining the Problem/Problem Set. The problem set is defined as a list of reasons that can prevent the shift of the current state to the desired state. When engaging complex systems and environments, many problems will emerge. It is critical to identify relevant problems, examine the relationships among them, and then group them into those problems representative of the OE and the mission. The CMO planner is critical in identifying those problems, within the civil dimension, that when solved will aid in achieving the commander’s desired state.

During problem framing, some of the things a CMO planner should consider are:

- Sources of stability and instability.
- Civil factors and relevance.
- Cultural dimensions.
- Civil environment and infrastructure.
- Stakeholders.
- HN baseline capability and capacity.

- CMO/CA resources within the MAGTF.
- CPB.
- PMESII/ASCOPE.

Like the intelligence section's IPB, CPB is a continuous process for CMO professionals. As planning progresses and additional information is developed on the environment, the adversary, and the friendly force, the CPB should be modified to reflect this. The CMO planner must ensure that relevant and significant CPB developments are disseminated to the OPT.

The Red and Green Cells are formed during problem framing and are largely built around the IPB and CPB respectively. The G-2 exercises cognizance over the Red Cell, while either the G-3, or when established, the G-9, exercises cognizance over the Green Cell. The Red Cell is designed to emulate enemy actions while the Green Cell emulates the various actions of the civilian population during the wargame step of the MCPP.

The Green Cell works with the CMOWG and uses the CPB with related CMO planning support products to create a civil environment model that includes the civil most likely and civil most disruptive actions. These products will be employed during both COA development and COA wargame to inform the development of friendly COAs and then sharpen those COAs in the wargame.

Resource Availability and Shortfalls. During problem framing, the CMO planner identifies resource availability and shortfalls. Resource availability includes those capabilities within the MAGTF that support CMO (e.g., CA, reconnaissance, engineer, route, civil, medical, dental, distribution support, movement control, security). Additionally, the CMO planner identifies those CMO related resource shortfalls necessary to achieve the desired future or end state. Civil-military operations resource shortfalls might include interpreters, cultural SME's, information related capabilities, and humanitarian aid.

Commander's Critical Information Requirements Review/Update. The CMO planner will identify friendly and priority information requirements related to the civil dimension. Friendly force information requirements (FFIRs) are oriented internally on the MAGTF and represent information critical to support the commander's decision-making cycle. Priority information requirements (PIRs) are oriented on the adversary and reflect assumptions and uncertainty in enemy capabilities and intentions. Taken together, CCIRs drive critical decisions for the commander. The CMO planner supports the CCIR process by identifying information (friendly and priority) requirements critical to the commander's decision making, as well as those necessary to support continued staff action. An example of a CMO related CCIR might be "Dislocated civilian movement that disrupts MAGTF maneuver." This CCIR will require a decision by the MAGTF commander to either continue the current scheme of maneuver and employ measures to mitigate DC impacts or adopt an alternate SOM to avoid DCs. These choices will be driven by information collected through the ISR and CIM plans and then presented to the commander for decision.

Requests for Information. The CMO planner identifies RFIs to remove assumptions, support future plans, or conduct current operations. Based on the CPB and information requirements

(including CCIRs), gaps in civil information are identified and forwarded to the appropriate staff section/ higher headquarters (HHQ) as RFIs. The RFI manager logs and tracks all RFIs. It is imperative that the CMO planner thoroughly research all available planning support documents, including HHQs orders, IPB, staff estimates, estimates of supportability, US policy for the region, and other related guidance prior to submitting an RFI. The information management officer (IMO) and/or information management plan provides the structure, process, and procedures necessary to submit and track RFIs across the staff and OPT. Any RFI's that remain unanswered will be carried forward as risk during planning and execution. While the staff can answer most RFIs, more complex RFIs, or those involving senior level civil military engagement might be better suited for the commander to engage either a military or civilian counterpart.

Problem Framing Brief. The problem framing step culminates in the problem framing brief. This is the first time the OPT and staff's planning support products are integrated into a single cohesive document. The key output of the problem framing brief are an approved mission statement, commander's intent, operational approach, and COA development guidance. Those approved outputs in problem framing must be supported by staff actions performed during the problem framing step. Some commanders might want to see the work that supports the other outputs, while others will prefer a tailored brief. The CMO planner provides the OPT with those planning support products related to the civil dimension that include:

- Updated CPB.
- CMO task analysis.
- CMO assumptions.
- CMO limitations.
- CMO shortfalls.
- CMO RFIs.
- Draft interorganizational coordination plan.
- Recommended CMO related CCIRs.
- CMO problem set.
- CMO initial staff estimate.

Commander's Course of Action Development Guidance. Course of action development guidance is a key output from the problem framing step and provides the staff with a framework for detailed planning. The OPT leader works closely with the commander to develop the rough-cut COA(s), and then the OPT refines those during the COA development step. The CMO planner will develop a draft CMO concept of support that facilitates the operational approach and rough-cut COA. The commander might need some time to think through the results of problem framing before issuing COA development guidance. During this time, a warning order can be issued to support continued planning activities.

Issue the Warning Order. The CMO planner can include civil considerations in the warning order necessary to continue planning activities with adjacent and subordinate units. An example of items to include in the warning order include the initial CIM plan, priority civil information requirements, BPT tasks to CA and CMO capabilities, and CMO planning support products developed during problem framing.

Course of Action Development

Course of action development produces one or more options for accomplishing the mission that was approved in problem framing. The COA(s) are developed from the design effort that informed the operational approach, which must provide sufficient guidance for detailed planning by the staff. When developing multiple COAs, each one must be distinguishable from the other in terms of means and methods that address the essential task identified in problem framing. The CMO planner will develop a CMO concept of support for each option developed by the OPT. The CMO concept of support to the COA must be suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete.




Figure 4-3. CMO Support to COA Development.

When developing COAs, the CMO planner considers two fundamental questions within the civil dimension:

- What needs to be done?
- How should it be done?

The answers to these questions will shape the key actions in COA development that include battlespace framework, task and purpose, command relationships, task organization, sequencing, how forces are arrayed, control measures, integration, and phasing. The CMO planner supports these activities by updating the CMO planning support products from problem framing and bringing those forward as injects into COA development.

One of the primary products developed during this step is the synchronization matrix. This product is used to synchronize forces and their actions across time, space, and purpose in relation to an adversary COA. The CMO planner will ensure that CMO tasks and objectives are included in this product. Typically, CMO will have its own functional row in the synchronization matrix, and the row is used to record CMO activities throughout the COA.

Initial Course of Action Development. Initial, or “rough cut” COAs are usually broadly sketched options that provide a rough task organization, scheme of maneuver, and enough information so that the initial COAs can be briefed to the commander to ensure that the options are meeting the commander’s intent.

The CMO planners review the CMO portions of the initial COAs with the G-9 or senior CA Marine to ensure the COA conforms to the commander’s COA development planning guidance as well as G-9/senior CA Marine guidance. This is the opportunity for the G-9 to make course corrections before the CMO working group conducts detailed CMO support to COA refinement.

A CAG commander or CA detachment officer in charge (OIC) may provide an estimate of supportability to the MAGTF based on METT-T and civil considerations analysis and participation in the planning process.

Course of Action Refinement and Completion. After the commander reviews the initial/rough cut COAs and provides any guidance, the planning group further develops, expands, and refines the COAs to be taken into COA wargaming.

Course of Action Graphic and Narrative and Civil-Military Operations Input. The COA graphic and narrative broadly encapsulates the supporting concepts of a COA by providing a verbal and pictorial representation of the concepts. The CMO planner should ensure that applicable portions of the CMO plan are correctly portrayed in the COA graphic and narrative. The graphic may display civil-military activities, locations of relief organizations, dislocated civilians, key infrastructure, and culturally or historically significant areas. The CMO graphic and narrative, when approved by the G-9 and the commander, forms the basis for applicable input to the OPT COA graphic and narrative. It should be synchronized with information in the Annex G: Civil-military operations, and in the CMO concept of support in the execution paragraph of the operation plan or operation order.

The planning group will develop a task organization for each COA; in turn, CMO planners will develop a CA task organization which captures how the G-9 intends to structure and resource the force with CA capabilities. At this time, command and support relationships may be established. Proper task organization ensures each unit is properly constructed, sized, and resourced to support the commander’s planning guidance.

Course of Action Brief. The planning group will present a COA brief to the commander and staff, in which each COA is briefed separately. The commander’s wargaming guidance may include what COAs they want war gamed, what critical events will be war gamed, and what wargaming methods will be used.

Commander’s Evaluation Criteria. The commander will usually provide evaluation criteria for COA wargaming. These criteria may be based on principles of war, risk factors, etc. In some cases, such as a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief mission, there may be CMO specific evaluation criteria.

In summary, CMO related outputs from COA development include, but are not limited to:

- Updated CPB.
- Green cell ML/MD COAs.
- Planning support tools, such as synchronization matrix.
- CMO graphic and narrative.
- Task organization of CA forces.
- Updated CMO staff estimate.
- CMO assessment plan.
- CMO concept of support.

As part of final preparation for the COA wargaming step, the CMO planner crosswalks the synchronization matrix with the CMO staff estimate and ensures that the CMO options are accurately recorded in the staff estimate. With these tools properly developed and synchronized, the CMO planner should be prepared to participate in the planning group COA wargaming.

Course of Action Wargaming

The purpose of COA wargaming is to improve the plan. Civil-military operations planners support the COA wargaming by providing a detailed CMO concept of support to include a completed synchronization matrix. The green cell supports COA wargaming by emulating the civil dimension. Just as with a red cell, the green cell will expand the problem, challenge the planning assumptions, provide understanding of the adversary and population through their cultural lens, and reveal overlooked opportunities.




Figure 4-4. CMO Support to COA War Game.

Civil-military operations input to COA wargaming include:

- Planning support tools, including the CMO COA graphic and narrative and synchronization matrix and decision support matrix.
- CMO concept of support.

- CMO staff estimates.
- Updated CPB with an event template and threat courses of action.
- Updated facts and assumptions.

The green cell provides briefs to the OPT that details an overview of the civil situation, to include a discussion of the most likely and most disadvantageous COAs from the civil perspective during wargame preparation. This brief should also include the current civil situation to include internal and external influences on the populace. It is critical that the green cell ensure civil actions are realistic. With this information, the CMOWG updates the situation and event templates to reflect tactical areas of interest that support the engagement of high value persons.

The steps involved in the CMO portion of a war game turn are as follows:

- Describe civil actions associated with friendly action.
- Assess enemy reaction and its impact on CMO related considerations.
- Consult green cell to determine most likely or most disadvantageous civil reaction in response to both friendly and adversary actions.
- Determine MAGTF CMO counteraction based on the enemy action and civil reaction. The green cell determines CMO actions and identifies recommendations for other functional area MAGTF counteractions that may impact the civil-military environment.
- Refine planning tools such as the CMO portion of the synchronization matrix.
- Record results on a CMO COA wargame worksheet.
- Record recommendations for modifications to the CMO actions and any CMO requirements to support potential branches and sequels identified by the planning group.
- Record pros and cons of CMO actions based on commander's and G-9's evaluation criteria.

Results from Wargaming. An updated COA graphic and narrative with information on the commander's evaluation criteria is the required output of the war game. Additional CMO specific outputs include:

- Updated CPB products.
- A CMO specific COA wargaming decision support matrix and synchronization matrix.

Refined/modified planning factors are:

- CMO task organization.
- Identification of CA assets required and shortfalls.
- Refined CMO related CCIRs.
- List of critical events and decision points significant from the CMO standpoint.
- Refined CMO staff estimate.

Course of Action War Game Brief. The CMO planner and CMOWG will provide input to the OPT for this brief; any input should be reviewed and discussed with the G-3 and G-9 CMO

staff to ensure accuracy and understanding. Additional information which should be discussed and that may be used in the war game brief includes:

- Updated CPB products.
- Overview of CMO actions within each COA.
- Significant civil-military events or situations noted during the war game.
- Identification of any additional CMO tasks.
- Revised CMO operational graphic and narrative.
- Revised CMO portion of synchronization matrix.
- CMO resource shortfalls.
- New CMO RFIs.
- Risk assessment of friendly actions and events that negatively impacted the civil environment.
- CMO specific elements related to the commander’s evaluation criteria.

The COA war game brief concludes with the commander’s approval of any recommended changes to the COAs.

Course of Action Comparison and Decision

During this step, the commander evaluates each friendly COA against established criteria, compares the COAs with each other, and then selects the COA that they believe will best accomplish the mission (see Figure 4-5).

Using this evaluation criteria, the commander or their representative leads a discussion about the relative merits of each COA. The senior CMO planner should be an active participant in this discussion and provide clear and concise evaluation of each COA from a civil-military perspective. This evaluation should be based on experience, judgment, the CMO staff estimate, and the detailed notes recorded by the CMO planner and CMOWG during the COA wargaming step. Typically, functional area representatives and commanders will also provide estimates of supportability for each COA.




Figure 4-5. CMO Support to COA Comparison and Decision.

Once each COA has been individually evaluated, the commander then compares the COAs against one another. It is important to note that the most advantageous COA from a civil perspective may not be the most advantageous COA from another functional area perspective. Depending on the nature of the mission (e.g., humanitarian assistance or disaster relief), the civil perspective may take priority over other functional areas. The commander may use a comparison and decision matrix, as shown in Table 4-1, to help compare one COA against another.

Table 4-1. Example COA Comparison and Decision Matrix

Criteria	Weight	COA #1	COA #2	COA#3
Fewer DCs on main supply route (faster movement)	4	3 12	2 8	1 4
Avoid collateral damage	2	2 4	2 4	3 6
Engage key leaders	1	2 2	1 1	3 3
Gains cooperation of civilian populace	1	2 2	1 1	3 3
Preserves key infrastructure	2	3 6	2 4	1 2
Amount of HA likely to be needed	2	1 2	2 4	3 6
TOTALS		28 ○	22 ○	24 ○

- Notes: 1. Best COA is assigned the highest value of the three COAs.
 2. Formula to compute value is to multiply weight times ranking (1, 2, or 3) for that COA
 3. Highest number is most likely COA

The commander selects a COA, which could be a COA as developed and war gamed, or a modification or combination of the wargaming COAs, and this approved COA becomes the basis for the concept of operations (CONOPS). Once approved, the CMO supporting concept becomes the basis for CMO concept of support to the approved CONOPS.

Orders Development

Orders development is the process of translating the commander’s decision into oral, written, and graphic communications sufficient to guide implementation of the decision and provide initiative by subordinates. The G-9 or CMO planner is responsible for producing the Annex G. This is a collaborative process involving all CMO capabilities that will use this document as the basis for their orders development to ensure CMO unity of purpose and effort. Key planning products used in orders development are:

- Civil affairs staff estimate constructed through the planning process.
- CMO graphic and narrative.
- CMO Synchronization Matrix.




Figure 4-6. CMO Support to Orders Development.

Once all staff sections have completed their portions of the order, a detailed internal review of the force order is conducted. This is the orders reconciliation process. The purpose of reconciliation is to ensure the basic order and all annexes and appendices are complete and in agreement. The CMO planner will ensure that Annex G information aligns with CMO related information in the basic order and the synchronization matrix.

After the order has been reconciled internally, the staff then conducts orders crosswalk. The previously reconciled order is now compared with higher, adjacent, and subordinate command orders to ensure unity of effort and that the overall commander’s intent is met. The CMO planner should ensure that the Annex G is concise, complete, and fully understood by CMO subordinate elements who will execute the plan.

Transition

Transition is the process that shifts the effort from planning to execution. It may consist of a range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals involving all elements of the force. At a minimum, transition includes a transition brief along with a handover and explanation of any execution tools developed during planning (e.g, decision support matrix, execution checklist).




Figure 4-7. CMO Support to Transition.

The CMO planner and CMOWG will be an active participant in force transition briefs and drills to ensure that CMO actions and objectives are fully understood and integrated into execution. The CMO planner will need to brief the CMO concept of support. Key products for the transition brief include CMO—

- Graphic and narrative.
- Task organization.
- Execution checklist.
- Decision Support Matrix.

Whenever possible, the G-9 should also conduct CMO functional transition events. A CMO rehearsal of concept drill will help to ensure CMO unity of effort and success in execution.

CHAPTER 5

TARGETING AND CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

Success within the range of military operations and across the competition continuum, requires the use of several integrating processes to harmonize forces and warfighting functions in support of the commander's decision-making process. Integrating processes consist of a series of steps that incorporate multiple disciplines to achieve a specific end. Key integrating processes that occur within the MAGTF's battle rhythm include—

- Information collection.
- IPB and CPB.
- Knowledge management.
- Targeting and assessment.
- Risk management.

Modern conflict requires a targeting philosophy for the civil environment that can respond very quickly to changes in that environment, maximize the collection and exploitation of available information, and sustain concurrent target development and execution at a tempo to facilitate achieving decision superiority over the threat. The targeting process is an iterative, and logical means necessary for the development, planning, execution, and assessment of target engagements. Commanders establish a targeting team (e.g., working group) to assist in planning. Staff components working together to form the targeting working group include, but are not limited to, enablers such as fire support, intelligence, operations, plans cells and influence assets such as MISO, CA, and cleared interorganizational partners (e.g., U.S. Embassy or interagency representatives). Representatives from these cells and elements are essential to a comprehensive targeting process, but other members of the staff help them in the planning and execution phases of targeting. Close coordination among all cells and elements is crucial for a successful targeting effort.

A target is an entity or object that performs a function for the threat considered for possible engagement or other action. A threat is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. Targets fall into one of five target types: facility, individual, virtual, equipment, or organization, also referred to as FIVE-O and include an array of mobile and stationary forces, equipment, and capabilities that span the physical, information, and human dimensions and that a threat can use to conduct operations. A target's importance is determined by its potential contribution to achieving a commander's objectives or otherwise accomplishing assigned tasks or establishing an effect. Targets are continuously refined or adjusted as an operation unfolds consistent with the commander's objective(s) and the end state.

Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. Understanding the

objectives, intentions, capabilities, and limitations of all actors within the OE enables the coordinated use of joint, interagency, and multinational means (i.e., fires) to accomplish tasks, create effects, and achieve objectives. Targeting is an integral part of the operations process that organizes the efforts of the commander and staff to integrate and synchronize fires in operations. At its most basic level, targeting seeks to create specific desired effects through lethal and nonlethal actions and includes:

- Destroying, defeating, degrading, capturing, or neutralizing threat systems and forces.
- Isolating, limiting, shaping, or neutralizing non-military actors aligned to or supporting threat forces.
- Enhancing, supporting, shaping, or informing non-military actors that are friendly, non-aligned, or neutral.
- Protecting non-combatants and critical elements of the civil dimension.

MAGTF TARGETING GUIDANCE AND POLICIES

United States policy influences CMO. Policy development is the responsibility of the USG. Policy implementation may be the responsibility of the MAGTF. If so, commanders must receive or request guidance to plan for and achieve military-political objectives. Marine air-ground task force commanders must express their intent early in the planning process and include appropriate CMO guidance to staffs and subordinate commanders to facilitate close coordination with civilian partners. Marine air-ground task force commanders must always include guidance that speaks directly to how CMO coordination will take place and establish collaborative processes to build civil-military rapport, establish common civil-military objectives, and create interorganizational unity of effort.

The targeting working group ensures that the proposed commander's targeting guidance includes targeting priorities, operational objectives, high payoff targets, desired effects, target selection standards, authorized actions against targets, any delegated responsibilities for target validation and approval, and the desired end state. The commander should leverage ALL available capabilities to create desired effects.

The commander should also provide limitations as part of their targeting guidance. Section 1 of Executive Order 13732 of July 1, 2016, United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures To Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force, notes that the protection of civilians is fundamentally consistent with the effective, efficient, and decisive use of force in pursuit of US national interests. As a matter of policy, US forces routinely conduct operations under policy standards that are more protective of civilians than is required by the laws of armed conflict (LOAC). United States forces also protect civilians because it is the moral and ethical thing to do. Although civilian casualties are a tragic and unavoidable part of war, the US military is steadfastly committed to limiting harm to civilians. Restrictions at the tactical level are different than restrictions at the Joint level.

The MAGTF uses fire support coordination measures to include no fire areas, target list worksheets, and rules of engagement (ROE). Joint forces promulgate the joint force

commander's no-strike list (NSL) and the restricted target list (RTL). The RTL applies to all subordinate echelons. The NSL consists of objects or entities protected by—

- Law of war.
- International laws.
- ROE.
- Other considerations.

An RTL is a valid target list with specific restrictions such as—

- Limit collateral damage.
- Do not strike during daytime.
- Strike only with a certain munition.
- Proximity to protected facilities and locations.

Awareness of the provisions of LOAC is essential to the conduct of CMO, as MAGTF activities will involve significant interaction with non-combatants occupying the same area. The LOAC are comprised of the following basic principles.

Military Necessity. This refers to only taking actions that are necessary to achieve a legitimate military objective. Military objectives are defined as any object which by its nature, location, purpose, or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. This principle prevents things such as torture to gain confessions and injuring the enemy except during the fight.

Avoidance of Unnecessary Suffering (Humanity). This principle prohibits the use of any kind or degree of force not necessary for the purposes of war, which is resulting in the submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of life, time, and physical resources. We must avoid inflicting any unnecessary suffering and keep from destroying the enemy's property just for the sake of wreaking havoc. As an example, the principle of humanity differentiates the use of land mines versus improvised explosive devices ("booby traps"). Booby traps are prohibited under the rules of LOAC. An anti-personnel mine is a concealed ordnance designed to kill personnel in the battlefield. On the other hand, a booby trap is an ordnance which is also designed to kill people but is disguised as an otherwise innocuous object unrecognizable as ordnance, and specifically intended to draw the interest of enemy personnel. Not only could enemy personnel be killed, but an unsuspecting civilian or child could also be killed.

Proportionality. Loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. Any excessive destruction or suffering not required to accomplish the objective is illegal as a violation of the LOAC. This does not mean the MAGTF is required to use the minimum amount of force necessary to destroy a target. What it does mean, is that the use of force should not be so excessive that collateral damage is disproportionate to the amount of force necessary to achieve the legitimate military objective.

Distinction or Discrimination (Chivalry). To ensure respect for, and protection of, the civilian population and civilian objects, the parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants.

During a time of conflict, the MAGTF may only attack lawful targets, which include certain people, places, and things. Combatants are lawful targets. A combatant is anyone engaging in hostilities in an armed conflict on behalf of a party to the conflict. All members of the military are combatants except for medical personnel, chaplains, prisoners of war, wounded and sick, shipwrecked, and parachutists escaping disabled aircraft. Noncombatants are NOT legal targets. Noncombatants include the exceptions above and civilians. A noncombatant poses no military threat, so there is no military necessity in targeting them. However, if a noncombatant presents a threat in word or action, they have given up their protected status and become unlawful combatants. Unlawful combatants are legal targets. Elements of the MAGTF always have a right to self-defense.

TARGETING APPROACH

The targeting approach (or cycle) is a continuous process that is not time-constrained nor rigidly sequential, as some steps in various phases may be conducted concurrently. It provides an essential framework to describe the steps that are accomplished to conduct targeting effectively. The targeting approach supports both deliberate and dynamic targeting, and provides the flexibility required when the concept of operations, commander's intent, or plans change. For example, the targeting approach enables the application of all relevant systems (e.g., physical, electronic, informational) to achieve lethal or nonlethal effects in the battlespace. Typically (but not exclusively), CMO staff can utilize the targeting approach to develop targets for the purpose of delivering nonlethal effects within the battlespace. Tactical intent for CMO effects will conform to centrally prioritized joint operational effects issued in orders or guidance from the JFC such as the information and influence narratives, themes, and objectives and tasks spelled out in the Joint Force Annex G. However, nonlethal engagement of friendly and neutral entities is not easily nested within the threat-oriented targeting approach. Nevertheless, commanders must implement a targeting approach that generates and harmonizes the desired lethal and nonlethal effects on all entities in the battlespace, whether friendly, neutral, or threat, there must be specific civil effects within the decisive events or operational objectives for the MAGTF.

Successful civil dimension targeting in complex environments is heavily reliant on cooperation, common understanding, and the exploitation of local civil information to:

- Locate specific suitable actors or target audience.
- Identify means and appropriate element to deliver influence effects or perform civil-oriented tasks.
- Assess effectiveness to facilitate informed follow-on targeting decisions.

The CMO staff must take every opportunity to remain informed of the commander's intent and direction and to collaborate with MAGTF staff and other influence enablers.

A deliberate nonlethal targeting approach is a methodical way to achieve desired civil-military effects over time. It is fundamentally different from lethal targeting that seeks to prosecute hard targets for immediate effect. A nonlethal targeting approach must accommodate civil operating environments that are fluid and not usually conducive to prescriptive approaches seeking predictable outcomes. Any approach to nonlethal targeting must be simple and adaptive for use in permissive, as well as uncertain security environments where hostile elements, such as insurgents, criminals, or embittered local populations inhibit or disrupt civil activities. A nonlethal targeting approach must offer an organizational construct that is logical, executable, and suitable for collaborative civil-military targeting.

An additional aspect to a nonlethal targeting approach is the need to classify discrete targets as positive, negative, or neutral, as they relate to the OE and its impact to MAGTF operations. These classifications help to differentiate the relative importance of nonlethal targets, but more importantly, they assist in identifying change or the need for change. Changes to the environment created by the MAGTF, or otherwise, may cause nonlethal targets to fluctuate between these classifications. Extreme fluctuation can become detrimental when positive and neutral targets become decidedly negative. Realistically, every civil environment will have positive, negative, and neutral influences that must be balanced to create stable conditions that are normal to the AO.

One approach to non-lethal targeting is to organize non-lethal civil-military activities into the following categories: infrastructure build, institutional development, provision of services, and significant personalities. Infrastructure build addresses physical infrastructure and economic development positive or neutral targets. Institutional development addresses governance, justice, and security nonlethal targets. Provision of services addresses quality of life issues. Significant personalities address positive, negative, and neutral parties capable of impacting MAGTF operations. These categories provide logical lines of effort that can be further subdivided into manageable tasks. These categories also provide a construct for MAGTF CMO planners to audit required resources and to identify capability gaps that necessitate external support.

JOINT TARGETING

The joint targeting cycle is an iterative, logical methodology for the development, planning, execution, and assessment of targeting, weapons, and capabilities effectiveness. Principles of joint targeting can apply in multinational operations, and may involve participation from other agencies, departments, and organizations throughout all phases of an operation. The joint targeting process is inherently important to MAGTF CMO because it provides the necessary military framework for interorganizational collaboration to take place. Interorganizational collaboration is the capability of organizations (or a set of organizations) to enter into, develop, and sustain interorganizational systems in pursuit of collective goals. The employment of nonlethal and lethal MAGTF capabilities, as it relates to targeted efforts, must be guided by common taxonomy and lexicon that can be understood throughout the joint community and civilian partners.

The joint targeting process is used to link desired effects to actions and tasks and consists of the following six-phase iterative process:

1. End state and commander's objectives.
2. Target development and prioritization.
3. Capabilities analysis.
4. Commander's decision and force assignment.
5. Mission planning and force execution.
6. Assessment.

The Marine Corps' targeting methodology of decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) feeds into the joint targeting process.

Marine air-ground task force commanders usually use the D3A methodology to support joint fires planning and interface with the joint targeting cycle. The D3A methodology incorporates the same fundamental approach of the joint targeting cycle and functions within phase five of the joint targeting cycle. The D3A methodology facilitates synchronizing maneuver, intelligence, and fires. Like the joint targeting cycle, D3A is not time-constrained nor rigidly sequential. Some steps in various phases may be conducted concurrently. Civil-military operations staff integrate into the D3A in the following manner.

Decide. Decide includes target identification and prioritization, then target audience analysis and target systems analysis to determine the task, target, effect, location, apportionment of inform and influence personnel, as well as means and mechanism. The process of decide includes review and coordination of civil dimension inform and influence effects at appropriate WGs (e.g., CMO WG, information WG). Progress and recommendation through the targeting WG as an essential fire support task (EFST) and presentation using the target information worksheet or target folder.

Detect. Detect includes identifying collection requirements, allocating collection tasks for locating the target and tracking the target until the engagement occurs. For nonlethal effects in the civil dimension, this can include establishing a reliable telephone point of contact for an individual, a media outlet that a target group utilizes, or the physical location. For more enduring civil effects and collection, detection tracking may include development of a receptive and familiar relationship with an individual key influence, an organization, or a population to develop the required rapport through military to civil liaison over time.

Deliver. Deliver in the nonlethal effect context for the civil dimension requires coordinated, synchronized, inform and influence activities and maneuver effects for the civil space within the MAGTF's AO. This includes a CMO, or inform and influence activities, concept development, force apportionment and tasking, planning and preparation by the tasked MISO and CA forces, as well as conduct of the task. The inform and influence activities concept at the joint force level may have a number of associated tasks across AOs, or over time, and involve maneuver forces, CMO liaison, MISO messages and production, as well as support from other related capabilities (e.g., interagency) or subject matter expertise (e.g., foreign area officer, staff non-commissioned officer). Delivery of nonlethal effects in the civil dimension should never be considered in the same way as a lethal strike with immediate and enduring results. Relationship trust and similar

effects, as well as messages, take time to resonate and their impact requires maintenance of the effort to ensure it is enduring.

Assess. Assess includes immediate combat assessment of the task or message delivery as a measure of performance. This is gauged by the first and second order temporal effect indicators by effect on the target audience reception and changed behavior (was the “message” delivered correctly?). This is delivered in post activity reporting and at the next target WG. Assessment of nonlethal effects in the civil dimension also includes assessment of effects across information-related tasks and over time to monitor the second and third order information effects, as well as third order physical effects. These are reported as MOEs to subsequent target WGs and will inform re-attack guidance, modification, and priority of effort for MAGTF tasking. Assessment also considers the combined inform and influence activities effects across the civil dimension toward achievement of condition-marking decision points, decisive events, or transition conditions. These are reported as MOEs.

Marine air-ground task force nonlethal targeting methods must remain consistent with the joint targeting process to maintain unity of effort throughout the joint force. Different methods are used to pursue lethal and nonlethal activities, but these methods must coexist in an integrated targeting effort with compatible iterative steps that lead to overall mission accomplishment.

ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Understanding the environment is the most important aspect of a collaborative targeting effort because a solid grasp of the civil environment helps the MAGTF commander and staff to better formulate and identify root causes of instability that should become the focus of civil efforts. A thorough understanding of the OE requires analysis of social systems and their interrelationships. Political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure should be examined comprehensively as a network because root causes of instability are rarely isolated to just one system or issue. These systems with their major elements, interrelationships, and multitude of nodes combine to create adaptive complex relationships that evolve with changing circumstances.

Collaborative targeting efforts seek to influence change by exploiting windows of opportunity to positively affect overall system behavior. It is essential to understand that systems involving economic, political, and social interaction are dominated by humans, who continually adapt to actual or anticipated actions, and are not open to easy observation or predictable behavior. Therefore, CMO targeting must expect uncertainty, augment traditional intelligence gathering with expert judgment, and apply intuition in cases where reliable information does not exist.

Civil partners may use different approaches or methods in targeting but the common denominator must be the shared understanding of the civil environment. A shared understanding sets conditions that allow for mutual support and collaboration.

Civil Analysis

Civil analysis is accomplished through civil reconnaissance, data mining, and information sharing and is supported by the civil information management system. The analysis of civil

information necessitates close examination of ASCOPE as it relates directly to the civil operating environment. Use of continual processes, such as CPB and other pertinent methods (e.g., stability assessment framework) produce relevant civil considerations that inform MAGTF planning and potentially direct CMO targeting.

Analysis of the civil environment occurs in conjunction with IPB, and it is an ongoing effort throughout MAGTF operations that must be pursued jointly with external partners and fused with all available analytical products to facilitate unity of effort among interorganizational partners. Iterative civil analysis is profoundly important because CMO targeting must stay abreast of evolving environments that directly affect CONOPS and the pursuit of extant civil activities.

A key point to recognize in conducting civil analysis is the relative effort, order of magnitude, and degree of difficulty associated with compiling and analyzing civil information in highly complex environments. Civil analysis also requires subject matter expertise that may not be within the core competencies of the MAGTF, such as language, religion, economic and infrastructure development, and institution building. Marine air ground task force commanders, CMO planners, and CA forces must recognize this potential shortfall in CA manpower and civil expertise and seek to leverage every means available to obtain refined civil information that is being produced by interorganizational partners.

Civil Reconnaissance

Habitual interaction between Marine corps forces and civilian organizations is critical to achieving a more complete understanding of the OE. Every civilian in the AO is a potential source of civil information. Civil-military operations planners, in coordination with the CA detachments, integrate civil reconnaissance into the CONOPS, support the development of a comprehensive COP that highlights civil considerations, and influences the commander's decision-making process. It does so by providing relevant information focused on lucrative civil activities and the accomplishment of MAGTF objectives. Potential sources of civil information from a coordinated civil reconnaissance plan include:

- Observations made by combat elements and CA detachments in routine operations.
- Results of stability assessment questionnaires.
- Debriefings of Marines involved in various civil projects, such as community health engagement (e.g., medical civic action program, dental civic action program, veterinary civic action program, fishery civic action program).
- ASCOPE assessments that are relevant to or highlight stability trends.
- Researching civil information using the appropriate databases.
- Researching DOS background notes.
- Information gathered from Marine Corps Intelligence Activity country studies.
- Information gathered from NGOs and the interagency.
- Information gathered from social media.
- Cultural information, like religious and tribal affiliations.
- Interaction with interorganizational partners.
- Interaction with HN government officials.
- Reach-back support provided by culture, civil affairs, and CMO SMEs.

These efforts help to refine and maintain situational awareness of the OE and must be conducted continuously to ascertain changes to the environment that affect MAGTF operations and the conduct of CMO collaborative targeting.

SELECTING TARGETS AND TRACKING PROGRESS

In all MAGTF operations, assessment is critical to the commander's efforts in ascertaining "success" in the battlespace. However, assessment is usually focused on impact against an enemy (usually captured by MOE) or MAGTF performance of tasks (measures of performance). Impact to the civil environment is likely not being considered at all. Civil-military operations staff should provide the commander information on second or third order effects of military operations, especially potential impacts to inform and influence activities. Assessments underpin and drive nonlethal targeting. Assessments are the impetus behind generating collaborative iterative processes where targets are continually evaluated and pursued. Civil-military operations targeting will not be successful if assessment processes, methods, and procedures are not understood and addressed early in the initial planning phase.

Similarly, all targets on the target list or the RTL need to be reviewed for civil impact. Targeted critical infrastructure in an AO requires a thorough assessment for the commander to ensure they have all the information necessary to make a proportionality versus military necessity decision. All other targets need a review to advise commanders of any civil impacts that may not be readily apparent (e.g., population densities, proximity to CAT I & CAT II targets).

Critical infrastructure can be defined as communications and information; transportation and distribution; energy; economics and commerce; administration and human services, which includes law enforcement, health and sanitation services, water distribution, and structures of social, political, religious, or cultural significance; weapons of mass destruction production facilities and dual-use facilities that could be used to produce weapons of mass destruction. Critical infrastructure assessment methodology recommendations can be found in JP 3-06, *Joint Urban Operations*.

Most targets will have some level of civil concern. For those targets, some level of informal civil impact review should be conducted resulting in a one to two-line assessment. For example, a targeted residence in a residential neighborhood may result in, "There is a Category I facility, a medical clinic, 600 meters (danger close) from the target, and the target is in a high-density residential neighborhood." The commander will decide what response to take based on CMO related information. Recommendations developed during the assessment should be provided if asked for by the commander. For example, "Continued civil reconnaissance needs to be conducted." For targets with absolutely no civil impact (trench line in the desert), a simple "No civil impact" is sufficient. It should be noted that silence in this process, is not consent. Target assessments may be captured in a variety of formats, such as an information paper or PowerPoint briefing.

APPENDIX A

CIVIL PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

Civil preparation of the battlespace is an iterative analytical method used to examine the civil operating environment. It analyzes different aspects of civil information and assesses the civil impact of friendly, adversary, external actors, and the local populace on MAGTF operations. The purpose is to gain a comprehensive understanding of the civil operating environment to inform decision makers of possible civil actions that may impact MAGTF missions. The following four steps are used to develop CPB products:

1. Define the civil operating environment.
2. Analyze the civil operating environment.
3. Develop a civil environment model.
4. Determine civil actions.

Civil Preparation of the Battlespace Execution

Step 1: Define the civil operating environment. This step focuses on collecting civil information. This is a disciplined approach to gather and organize civil information, categorize, and record the results. The starting point of this effort may be an existing area study of the designated AO to be further refined using civil consideration matrices. At a minimum, information will be categorized using standard civil considerations (ASCOPE) as the baseline. This product (either in ASCOPE or ASCOPE / PMESII format) is the basis of all further civil information collection. Gather and organize information relevant to the assigned AO: This is the “what do I see?” approach to looking at the data. For example, consider:

AREAS—Consider how areas affect the MAGTF’s mission (terrain, vegetation, weather, urban areas, civilian movement corridors)? How do MAGTF operations impact civilian activities in these areas?

STRUCTURES—Are there structures with significance to MAGTF operations (government buildings, bridges, churches, power, water, etc.)? What are consequences/implications of destruction/damage? What are the benefits for controlling or protecting key structures?

CAPABILITIES—What are the capabilities of the population to sustain itself (e.g., public administration, safety, emergency services)? What resources and services can support the MAGTF’s mission?

ORGANIZATIONS—What are the organized groups affiliated/not affiliated with the government? Are there key leaders associated with these groups? Are there non-indigenous organizations present (e.g., NGOs, IOs, foreign militaries)?

PEOPLE—How many people live in the AO? What is the demography? Who are the key individuals in the local population and what can they do to assist MAGTF operations? Are the people cooperative/uncooperative with their government and/or MAGTF operations?

EVENTS—What are the agricultural seasons (e.g., planting, harvesting)? What are the holidays/festivals and when do they occur? Are there patterns of natural disaster events? Determine information requirements.

- Evaluate existing databases and determine intelligence and information gaps.
- Collect materials and submit RFIs.

Organize the information gathered. For example, time permitting, further refine ASCOPE utilizing operational variables (PMESII).

- Political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of government, to include political structure (both formal and informal).
- Military variable includes the military capabilities of all armed forces (e.g., host nation, insurgents, local militia, and police).
- Economic variable consists of general economic categories of the AO (e.g., energy, raw materials, labor distribution, income/food distribution, goods/services, and illicit markets).
- Social variable describes societies within an operational environment (population members are subject to the same political authority, occupies a common territory, have a common culture, and shares a sense of identity).
- Information variable involves the collection, access, use, manipulation, distribution and reliance on data, media, and knowledge systems (both civilian and military) by the local communities.
- Infrastructure variable includes the basic facilities, services and installations needed for a community or society to function.

The finished product for Step 1 is a collation of civil considerations (ASCOPE) organized by operational variables (PMESII) as seen in Table A-1.

Table A-1. ASCOPE / PMESII Analysis Example.

	P	M	E	S	I	I
	Political	Military/Police	Economic	Social	Infrastructure	Information
A Areas	Political Areas (district boundary, party affiliation areas)	Military Areas (coalition/local nation bases, historic ambush/IED sites)	Economic areas (bazaars, shops, markets)	Social areas (parks and other meeting areas)	Irrigation networks, water tables, medical coverage	Radio/ television/ newspapers (where people gather for word-of-mouth)
S Structures	Political structures (town halls, government offices)	Military/police buildings (police HQ, military HHQ locations)	Economic structures (banks, markets, storage facilities)	Social structures (churches, restaurants, bars)	Infrastructure structures (roads, bridges, power lines, walls, dams)	Information structures (cellular/ radio/ television towers, print shops)
C Capabilities	Political capabilities (dispute resolution, insurgent capabilities)	Military capabilities (security posture, strengths and weaknesses)	Economic capabilities (access to banks, ability to withstand natural disasters)	Social capabilities (strength of local and national ties)	Infrastructure capabilities (ability to build/maintain roads, walls, dams)	Information capabilities (literacy rate, availability of media/phone service)
O Organizations	Political organizations (political parties and other power brokers, UN)	Military organizations (what units of military, police, insurgent are present)	Economic organizations (banks, large land holders, big businesses)	Social organizations (tribes, clans, families, youth groups, NGOs/ IOs)	Infrastructure organizations (government ministries, construction companies)	Information organizations (news groups, influential people who pass word)
P People	Political people (governors, councils, elders)	Military people (leaders from coalition, local nation, and insurgent forces)	Economic people (bankers, landholders, merchants)	Social people (religious leaders, influential families)	Infrastructure people (builders, contractors, development councils)	Information people (media owners, mullahs, heads of powerful families)
E Events	Political events (elections, council meetings)	Military events (lethal events, loss of leadership, operations)	Economic events (drought, harvest, business open/close)	Social events (holidays, weddings, religious days)	Infrastructure events (road/bridge construction, well digging, scheduled maintenance)	Information events (IO campaigns, project openings, CivCas events)

Legend:

CivCas civilian casualty

IO information operations

Step 2: Analyze the civil operating environment. The focus of effort in this step is to analyze the information collected during Step 1. Analysis takes into consideration operational variables, operational culture, and instability/stability dynamics. The finished products include a civil

environment factors and relevance matrix, operational culture matrix, instability/stability factors matrix.

Conduct ASCOPE-PMESII analysis. The ASCOPE-PMESII analysis is used to examine civil considerations more closely as it relates to accomplishing the MAGTF mission. The initial effort in Step 2 is to carefully examine civil considerations using operational variables [PMESII] to ascertain factors relevant to MAGTF operations. Below is an example of analyzing “areas” using the ASCOPE/PMESII construct and the application of relevant questions:

- Areas/Political—What is the political situation in the AO? What are the political boundaries? What is significant?
- Areas/Military—What military capabilities are in the AO? What are the military boundaries? What is significant?
- Areas/Economic—What are the key and decisive areas of economic activity?
- Areas/Social—What is the social climate in the AO? What are the key and decisive social factors that affect the AO (e.g., ethnic enclaves, crime districts)?
- Areas/Information—How is information collected and disseminated in the AO? What are the key and decisive information requirements in the AO?
- Areas/Infrastructure—What are the key and decisive elements of infrastructure in the AO? Where are the key and decisive elements of infrastructure located?

The analysis is conducted for each component of ASCOPE individually and considers the MAGTF mission, commander’s intent and guidance.

Determining factors and relevance through the ASCOPE-PMESII analysis method encompasses more than populating or repopulating 36 blocks with general information. Civil affairs Marines must understand “mining” for relevant and key factors of civil information is a focused and continuous process. An approach to capturing the most relevant ASCOPE/PMESII factors is compiling the information into a matrix as seen in Table A-2.

Table A-2. Civil Environment Factors & Relevance Matrix Example – "A" of ASCOPE.

Civil Considerations	Operational Variables	Factors What are the factors in the civil environment that will significantly affect friendly forces (positively and negatively)?	Relevance How will each factor affect the friendly forces?
AREAS	Political	Political boundaries are manipulated	Boundaries are drawn to favor one political faction over another
	Military	Military districts overlap economic regions	Military ownership of industry
	Economic	Economic development areas	Key industries and supply chains are linked through geographic location
	Social	Municipalities, towns, and villages are largely ethnically homogenous	Ethnic enclaves are prevalent with little intermingling
	Information	Telecommunication is widespread	Information is easily controlled by the government
	Infrastructure	Investment in infrastructure is uneven	Investment favors supporters of the regime

In addition to operational variables, operational culture and instability/stability dynamics variables are also examined in conjunction with ASCOPE/PMESII information. This is done to determine relevant factors derived from two different perspectives important to achieving a thorough understanding of the civil environment. Application of operational culture and instability/stability dynamics will ensure the final civil environment factors and relevance matrix is sufficiently complete to be carried forward into step 3.

Apply a cultural lens. Culture is the shared world view and social structures of a group of people that influences a person’s and a group’s actions and choices. All MAGTF operations impact the environment in which they are conducted. Similarly, the operational environment will have an impact on MAGTF operations. To better account for and anticipate civil impacts on MAGTF operations, CPB seeks to account for cultural considerations.

“Operational culture” consists of five “dimensions” influencing operationally relevant behavior, conduct, and attitudes. These operational culture dimensions involve the physical environment, the economy of a culture, social structures, political structures, and the beliefs and symbols of a culture group.

In describing the operational environment, (i.e., completing the ASCOPE-PMESII analysis method) cultural dimensions may inadvertently be addressed. For example, the “A” of ASCOPE may account for the physical environment dimension. Similarly, the “E” of PMESII may account for the economy of a culture dimension. Each of the five dimensions of operational culture will be present in a thorough ASCOPE-PMESII method.

Oftentimes, the desire to populate data overcomes a systematic approach to collecting data making an ASCOPE/PMESII incomplete. Knowledge of the local culture group allows Marines to frame planning and execution to create conditions facilitating conduct by indigenous people commensurate with MAGTF tactical or operational goals. To ensure that culture is considered and accounted for goes beyond the ASCOPE-PMESII analysis method. The dimensions of operational culture should be applied to the ASCOPE/PMESII data to determine operationally relevant information.

There is no singular approach to applying a cultural lens to the data collected in step 1. Every situation will require careful consideration based on commander's intent and guidance and the nature of the MAGTF's operations. Civil affairs Marines should endeavor to apply cultural perspective-taking (to "see" and "feel" others' behavior/actions in the frame of that person's culture) and cultural interpretation (the process by which understanding and meaning is derived) to the information they have gathered. The point of this approach is to minimize "mirroring," (i.e., viewing the information from a US Marine, Western mentality). Regardless of the approach taken, each of the five dimensions has factors that must be addressed:

Physical Environment. How do people in the culture use the environment? All cultures have developed a unique interdependent relationship with their physical environment. Operationally relevant features of the physical environment that must be considered are water, land, food, materials for shelter, climate/seasons, fuel/power and transportation and communications. Civil affairs Marines must determine what features of the physical environment are used by the populace in their daily effort to survive, because, HOW the MAGTF will use the 'their' physical environment during its operation will affect/influence the ability of the indigenous people in the AO to survive. Likewise, how the people use and interact in their physical environment influences the range of options available to the MAGTF.

Economy of Culture. All cultures have a specific system for obtaining, producing, and distributing the items that people need or want to survive in their society (e.g., food, water, cars, houses). This system (which does not necessarily require money or banks) is the economy of a culture. What are the economic exchange systems and the formal and informal economies that the culture uses? Additionally, CA Marines must consider how the economy impacts the structuring of social relationships.

Social Structures. All cultures assign people different roles, status, and power within the group. What is the way people organize themselves and distribute power and status? While there are many possible ways to categorize people, most societies around the world differentiate people based on the following characteristics: Age, gender, kinship, tribal affiliation, class, ethnicity, race, religious membership, key social structures, traditional authorities, organizations, or alliances. Civil affairs Marines must recognize the social structures of a culture group for the MAGTF to work effectively within local political, military, economic and social systems.

Political Structures. How do people in the culture determine authority and leadership? All cultures have a system that determines who leads the group and makes decisions about its welfare. How a group is ruled (and it may not be by a specific person or set of people) is referred to as the political structure of a culture. Considerations include formal (official recognition)

versus informal leadership (respected members of a community) and authority versus power, organizations, and alliances. Civil affairs Marines must understand the existing power and authority structure, how to work with the individuals within that structure and their influence on the economy and social structure.

Belief Systems. How do cultural beliefs shape people's behavior? All cultures have a shared set of beliefs and symbols that unite the group. Beliefs are based on more than religion. Some examples include ideologies (e.g, communism, slavery), history and stories, education, family and tradition, religious beliefs (both formal religious systems and informal religious systems). It is important for CA Marines to grasp the local history, legends, sayings, and religion of an area, as it may reflect local perceptions of Marine's behavior in the AO.

When applying a cultural filter to the information collected in step 1, a good approach is to consider the relevant questions posed in Appendix B of *Operational Culture for the Warfighter*. The operational culture matrix (see Table A-3) illustrates some of these questions. Applying a cultural lens to the ASCOPE/PMESII data will result in a greater understanding of key and relevant cultural factors affecting MAGTF operations.

Operational culture factors derived from this effort are compiled and included into the Civil Environment Factors and Relevance Matrix to develop the most comprehensive list of relevant factors up until this point in the CPB process.

Table A-3. Operational Culture Matrix Example

<p>How do people in the culture use the environment?</p> <p>Physical Environment</p>	<p>What are the economic exchange systems and the formal and informal economies that the culture uses?</p> <p>Economy</p>	<p>What is the way people organize themselves and distribute power and status?</p> <p>Social Structure</p>	<p>How do people in the culture determine authority and leadership?</p> <p>Political Structure</p>	<p>How do cultural beliefs shape people's behavior?</p> <p>Belief Systems</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What roles are expected of Marine personnel with respect to water use and provision? • What kinds of operational considerations are influenced by water, or override cultural aspects of water as a physical resource? • What land in the AO is/is not appropriate for certain groups of people to use? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How will Marine operations affect the informal economy and the people in it? • How does the formal economy rely upon the informal economy, and what abuses of the AO's population does this cause? • How will Marine expenditure in the local informal economy, or employment of local informal economic actors, influence the socio-economic balance of power in the AO? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At what age is someone considered a child or adult? • How should Marines prepare to respond to children that act as soldiers in militaries or insurgencies, or participate in violent activities against US forces? • What work, roles, activities, and spaces are assigned predominantly to men and women? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How is decision making organized, and who gets to make decisions? • Who do leaders have to consult, and to whom must they answer? • Who are formal leaders and what symbols indicate status? • How will alliance with one group affect Marine relationships with the other groups? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the pivotal historical stories that all people in the community share? • How are these histories, folktales and sayings used to support propaganda for or against Marine and US activities in the region? • Are the heroes or villains compared to Marines or Americans?
<p>Cultural Factors Affecting MAGTF Operations</p>				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Activities of life are centered on the seasons (dry and wet). Only life necessities occur during wet season. ▪ Goods and services are not traded across tribal lines. Most activity is informal. ▪ Society dominated by gender (male). ▪ Political power derived by loose confederation of tribal alliances. ▪ Muslims in the south feel oppressed by Christian majority. 				

Consider Instability/Stability Dynamics. The ASCOPE-PMESII analysis method is a flexible tool that can be used to provide both a macro and micro civil view of an area of operations. Similarly, accounting for instability/stability dynamics can be scoped toward the macro and micro level. The key difference between macro or micro-focused views relates to the level of effort in gaining an awareness of local perceptions, (i.e., it takes more effort to collate, assimilate

and comprehend the meaning of multiple local perception data from multiple areas versus targeted singular efforts for specific local areas).

In most cases CA Marines will be looking to understand instability and stability dynamics at a micro level. This includes understanding the grievances (instability) and resiliencies (stability) of the local population, identifying key influences, and identifying events that could affect stability and instability. Key influences are selected individuals, groups, assets, infrastructure, and socio-cultural belief sets or factors, which could have a significant influence on friendly mission accomplishment and should be considered in operational planning and execution.

Civil preparation of the battlespace deals primarily with understanding the civil dimension of the operational environment. To that end, population surveys (perception data) focused on instability/stability dynamics are very important endeavors, requiring careful consideration and even more vigilant planning when operating in remote areas where little or no information exists on local perceptions. However, in many instances perception data can be obtained through a variety of sources; for example, unit situation reports, US embassy sources (embassy reporting, USAID, etc.), UN sources, civil engagements, US Army human terrain team reports and tactical conflict surveys (TCSs). Perception data is then compiled and ordered with events and key influences (see Table A-4) where events are initially considered neutral until acted upon by key influences, which determine whether events are perceived as grievances or resiliencies.

Analysis of instability/stability factors is an iterative process. During CPB, the CA Marine should populate the instability/stability factors matrix to the best of their ability. Analysis continues during course of action development where further analysis of instability/stability factors are considered such as described below:

- Instability results when factors fostering instability (grievances) overwhelm societal resiliencies and/or the ability of the government to mitigate these factors. Civil affairs Marines should consider the following to assist in assessing grievances within the AO. What factors:
 - Decrease support for the government?
 - Increase support for “malign actors?”
 - Disrupt the normal functioning of society?
- Too often, efforts to alleviate instability obscure and undermine existing societal resiliencies. The analysis of resiliencies must compliment overall stability assessments and be strongly considered in planning MAGTF operations. Civil affairs Marines should consider the following to assist in assessing stability (resiliencies) within the AO. What factors:
 - Increase support for the government?
 - Decrease support for “malign actors?”
 - Increase societal and institutional capacity and capabilities?

The information derived in instability/stability analysis are compiled like operational culture and included into the Civil Environment Factors and Relevance Matrix to develop the most comprehensive list possible before proceeding to step 3 of the CPB process.

Table A-4. Instability/Stability Factors Matrix Example.

Grievances:	Events:	Key Influences - Means and Motivations:
What are the core grievances and societal vulnerabilities identified in your civil considerations (from perception data)?	Potential situations that could contribute to an increase in instability (from ASCOPE/PMESII)?	What are the influencers, the means and motivations that contribute to an increase of instability (from ASCOPE/PMESII)?
Local people feel neglected	Elections	Lack of representation in government.
Resiliencies:	Events:	Key Influences - Means and Motivations:
What processes, relationships, or institutions enable the society to function normally and peacefully? Are there any previous resiliencies that have been or are being undermined (from perception data)?	What potential or anticipated future situations could create an opening for key influences to further reinforce stability (from ASCOPE/PMESII)?	What key influences in the society preserve and strengthen stability? What means do they possess, what are the motives, and what actions are taken (from ASCOPE/PMESII)?
Strong clan ties	Intermarriage	Elders

Step 3: Develop a Civil Environment Model. During this step, evaluate the civil component and produce a Civil Environment Model like the technique used in producing a modified combined obstacle overlay.

A Civil Environment Model depicts a system of key influences. A Civil Environment Model includes:

- A narrative describing the civil environment that is specific to the area of operations.
- A key influences matrix produced from analytical methods, such as stakeholder and geospatial analysis.
- A civil “picture” or series of graphics depicting the civil environment and key influences.

Describe the Civil Environment. In describing a stable civil environment, the purpose is to model “normal” civilian life and activities. The stable environment and civil/social norms are described in narrative form following an outline like the matrix provided in Table A-5.

Table A-5: Stable Civil Environment Narrative Outline Example.

Describe Stable Civil Environment: Processes, relationships, and institutions that keep a society stable.	Describe Civil/Social Norms: Customs and practices often reflect deeper aspects of the culture. It is the lens which people perceive the world.
<p>Example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Legitimate judicial system ▪ Political persuasions ▪ Livelihood ▪ Acceptable violence levels ▪ Acceptable corruption levels ▪ “Normal” civil activities ▪ “Abnormal” civil activities 	<p>Example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Family/tribal affiliation ▪ Greetings ▪ Concept of time ▪ Historical/mythical events ▪ Gift/taboo/honor

The exact content of the narrative should be derived from previous analysis but should consist of all relevant civil factors that may extend beyond items outlined in Table A-5.

Identify key influences. Use previously developed products such as the Civil Environment Factors and Relevance Matrix, the Operational Culture Matrix and the Instability/Stability Factors Matrix as starting points. Key influences can be determined by asking the following questions:

- What are the sources and nature of the key influences that can affect friendly operations?
- By what manner/means can the key influences apply its influence on friendly operations?
- How quickly can the key influences impact be applied to affect friendly operations?
- What is magnitude (e.g., width, depth, number of people/groups, how much, how far) of the key influences’ effect?

If answers to the above questions indicate the key influences could significantly impact friendly operations, then that influence should be included in the Civil Environment Model.

For People or Groups, Determine Key Influence’s Motivations and Goals. For individuals and groups this may be difficult to determine, and an analytical “best guess” may have to suffice until the key influence can be further developed. In a dynamic environment, motivations, and goals may shift; therefore, a key influence may have both short- and long-term goals and distinguishing between the two sets may be important for determining how the key influence might enhance or degrade friendly operations. For intangible factors, there may not be any inherent motivations and goals. Techniques which could be used to determine motivations and goals include:

- Identify relationships/dynamics between key influence and their environment (i.e., people, places, things).
- Identify key influence conflicts and their sources, to include grievances, ethnic/religious tension, competition for natural resources, etc.

- Identify sources of resiliency—what structures, assets, means, etc., sustain the key influence and are used to retain position/power/legitimacy.
- Determine key influence desired end states—friendly, rival/threat, environment. Look at both short- and longer-term goals.

For People/Groups or Things, Determine Key Influence’s Abilities, Capabilities, and Means. Information used to identify key influence can be used and paired with a description of preferred actions and options. Determining “means” includes identifying tangible assets (e.g., people, places, things) that the key influence can employ, as well as intangible assets that give the key influence “means” (e.g., religious legitimacy)—the sources of resiliency and relationships/dynamics between key influence identified above may translate into critical “means” in this step.

For People/Groups, Places or Things, Evaluate Key Influences’ Potential Impact on Friendly Operations/Objectives. This is an assessment of key influences’ potential COA: Why, how, what, when and where the key influence can degrade or enhance friendly operations, and to what extent? During COA development of MCPP, this information will help to develop specific actions/tasks to either mitigate or take advantage of key influence effects on friendly operations and the civil environment. Table A-6 illustrates how to compile key influence information in a matrix format so that it can be used in the Civil Environment Model.

Table A-6. Key Influences Matrix.

Key Influences	Motivations and Goals	Abilities, Capabilities, Means	Potential Impact on Friendly Ops/Objectives
Governor	Political and economic power.	Viewed as legitimate and popular by the populace/ logistical support.	Will be instrumental in relief efforts/activities.
Cathedral	Religious symbol.	Highly regarded by population.	No fire area. Potential sanctuary for friend or foe.
Code of honor	Used to resolve petty offenses and theft in affected communities.	Temporary resolution without police or government official support.	Its negative impact on local communities will decrease unity of effort during the relief efforts/activities.
Clan/family structure	Bloodline loyalty and trust to maintain their perceived prominence.	Resource, security, and community/political support through group consensus.	Could be used in support of peaceful relief activities.


Produce Graphic Depiction of the Civil Environment and Key Influences. Produce products that depict important aspects of the civil environment based on the stable civil environment narrative and key influence analysis. The civil depiction may require multiple civil overlays that typically depict key terrain/infrastructure (e.g., churches/mosques, market centers, hospitals government centers [to include political boundaries], ports, airfields, movement corridors [time and distance between towns/villages], population centers/clan-family boundaries, DC camps and significant artifacts/monuments within the AO). Figures A-1 through A-4 are examples.

Jolo Island

- 618 sq miles
- Total island population: 530,000
- Jolo City population: ~16,000/sq mi
- Parang population: 71,495
- Maimbung population: 59,597

Initial displaced civilian/casualty report

- Jolo City: 25,000 displaced civilians
- Parang: 34 dead 1,300 missing
- Maimbung: 55 dead 2,300 missing
- Last known total internally displaced persons: 10,000




From Jolo City at 50 km/h

Site	Road Distance	Time
Parang	22 km	46 min
Maimbung	24.2 km	42 min
Talipao	21 km	25 min
Panamao	33.7 km	35 min

KEY

- Insurgent locations
- MEB/MEU objectives

Figure A-1. Macro Level Civil Physical Environment Depiction Example.



Ethnicity: Tusaug
Religion: 90% Islam (Sunni, belong to Sharfi)
 10% Catholic
Islamic Groups: Bangsmoro or Moro
Christians: Filipinos

Figure A-2. Macro Level Civil Population Depiction Example.

Barangays
Family/Clan Affiliation

- ① **Alat**
Nuria Tabib
- ② **Asturias**
Mashier Tan
- ③ **Bus-Bus**
Rigduan Undug
- ④ **Chinese Pier**
Hussein Hassan
- ⑤ **San Raymundo**
Ameli Tan
- ⑥ **Takut-Taku**
Jamhali Serajani
- ⑦ **Tulay**
Sali Hairai
- ⑧ **Walled City**
Alsid Gonzales



Figure A-3. Micro Level Civil Population Depiction Example.

- ① **Jolo Port**
20 foot draft low tide
- ② **National Highway**
Macadam/concrete
- ③ **Jolo Power and Electric**
- ④ **Jolo Municipal Building**
Jolo Police Station
- ⑤ **Jolo Airport**
Joint use by military and civilian
727/c-130 capable
- ⑥ **Jolo Catholic Church**
- ⑦ **Tulay Central Mosque**
- ⑧ **City Streets**
Macadam



Figure A-4. Micro Level Civil Key Infrastructure Depiction Example.

Step 4: Determine Civil Actions. The focus of this step is to utilize the information and analysis from previous steps to determine potential civil actions with respect to MAGTF operations within the AO. Civil actions are meant to model the independent will of the population and key influence relating to friendly and malign actions within the AO. Civil-military operations

planners and CA Marines develop an initial assessment of possible civil actions in a particular area within the MAGTF battlespace. This assessment is further refined by the green cell and used during COA wargaming. The green cell is a working group which assists the commander, staff and the OPT in understanding the effect of the civil environment on both friendly and threat forces. The cell articulates the actions and dynamics of selected individuals, groups, tangible assets, and societal-cultural factors in the civil environment which may significantly impact friendly operations. Like the red cell modeling adversary actions, the green cell is used throughout the entire planning process, but with a focus on testing, improving, and modifying friendly courses of action to enhance the desired friendly effects on the civil environment, and to mitigate potential negative effects. Determining potential civil actions serve to paint a more complete picture of the operating environment focused on indigenous people and their leadership, but also on IOs/NGOs or other stakeholders in the area of operation (e.g., battlespace, village, district, and province).

During this step, CMO planners and CA Marines validate their assumptions and provide updates to the existing CPB products as necessary. Lastly, during deliberate planning, civil actions are accounted for by being depicted as most likely/most disadvantageous civil actions like the way “threat” is depicted as most likely/most dangerous COAs.

The examples below are some of the considerations applied to determine civil actions:

- Historical patterns of the populace.
- What condition is the populace trying to achieve?
- Agendas or objectives of key influences.

These civil actions may influence or alter a decisionmaker’s approach to mission accomplishment. Step 4 results in a graphic and narrative depicting most likely/most disadvantageous civil actions as depicted in Figure A-5.

Phase I – Disaster Scenario

Most Likely Civil Action – Follow historical patterns

Jolo populace seeks families or clan members on higher ground, populace will move to IDP camp locations seeking aid and security. A LOW percentage of Jolo populace will remain in flood zone to protect property/belongings. Main MSRs will be congested, causing difficulty in the movement of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Less security due to Filipino Marines deploying out of Jolo will increase insecurity. Local criminal elements will exploit with an increase in looting and theft. MILF will increase broadcasts discrediting local officials ineptitude and calls JTF forces and occupying force.

Most Disruptive (Critical) Civil Action

Local populace not supportive of HN evacuation effort, kidnapping of relief workers and looting of supply warehouses and Relief Stations in Jolo occurring. MILF infiltrates IDP camps. Pirate MILF radio station step up "colonial power takeover." Kidnapping and murder of clan leadership increase. Village militias set up road blocks throughout Jolo blocking HN evacuation/relief efforts.

Most Advantageous Civil Action

Local populace engaged with local leadership in evacuation and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief planning and execution. Host nation leading humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts early in Phase I on Jolo. IDP camp security established with local Jolo security forces.


– **Who and what are the key influences/dynamics indicators?**

– Collection plan recommendations. DP/CCIR tripped.





– **How do things need to change to get there?**

– **Opportunities or vulnerabilities**

Civil Most Disruptive



KEY

-  displaced civilian camp
-  clashes
-  relief station
-  flow of displaced civilians to camps or clans

Legend:

MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front

Figure A-5. Civil Actions Graphic and Narrative Example.

APPENDIX B

PLANNER TEMPLATE (ANNEX G)

(Note: This example of an Annex G is to give an example of a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief or Stability operation involving a battlespace framework of Lines of Operation to categorize the MAGTF actions over time.)

Copy no. __ of __ copies
Official Designation of Command
Place of Issue
Date-time group

ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER (Number) (Operation CODEWORD) (U)
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

(a) *List map, publications, documents or references applicable to the operation.*

(U) TIME ZONE:

(U) TASK ORGANIZATION: *Can be described here but usually found in the Annex A (Task Organization), in most cases just refer the reader to "See Annex A."*

(U) Situation

a. (U) General

(1) (U) Overview. *Discuss the pertinent areas of the situation that affect the civil dimension for the upcoming operation. This could include the USG's purpose and endstate, the makeup of the US forces and the strategic desires of partnered nations and other stakeholders.*

(2) (U) Host Nation Government. *Discuss the federal and subordinate government structure. Who makes decisions, where are decisions made, does it have the capability to help the population recover; are a few questions to answer here.*

(3) (U) Population. *Discuss the general condition of the population the force will interface with. Highlight those key aspects that the Marine should know before they encounter the local population. Items could be cultural norms, capabilities, economy, perceptions of the USG, perceptions of their government and support systems. For example, this is a foot mobile culture and will need support to relocate. Refer the reader to the CPB Appendix for detailed information.*

(4) (U) Economics. *Discuss the economics of the operating area and what will be affected by the upcoming operation. What are the short term and long term effects of the military actions on the economy – can it recover quickly, does the host nation have the resources to rebuild or restart, are there some limiting actions needed in order not to create a bigger problem than necessary.*

(5) (U) Other necessary civil categories. *Discuss any and all areas that are important to relay to the reader as it relates to the civil dimension and the upcoming operation. Refer the reader to associated appendices for a more detailed discussion if needed.*

b. (U) Adversary. Annotate negative actors here (e.g., criminality). Answers: “*Who is our competition in time and space?*” Going back to the staff estimate, civil most likely reactions should be captured in paragraph 1. Especially the reactions that the execution of the plan is based on.

c. (U) Friendly

(1) (U) Higher. *Describe the relationship to higher and guidance related to CMO operations.*

(2) (U) Adjacent. *Describe the relationship to adjacent CA forces and their mission or area of responsibility.*

(3) (U) Other Civil Affairs Forces. *Describe the CA forces that are neither higher nor adjacent, applicable command relationships and liaison responsibilities.*

(4) (U) Host Nation Support. *Describe the relationship with the host nation. Identify host nation capabilities, organization, and goals in the area of responsibility. Identify capabilities, organizations, and goals to better identify areas of common ground and mutual operation. Identify key players and points of contact information.*

Note: This information may be included in a separate appendix to the Annex G depending on the scale and scope of host nation support.

(5) (U) International and nongovernmental organizations. *Describe the relationship with the host nation and US forces to include NGOs which may be reluctant to support or engage with the USG, as operations progress. Identify organization in the area of responsibility. Identify NGO/IO capabilities, organizations, activities, and goals in order to better identify areas of common ground and mutual operation. Consider how Marine Corps actions will impact the NGO/IO organization and activities. Identify key players and points of contact information.*

(U) Mission. *Can be rewritten here verbatim from the basic order. In most cases just write “See paragraph 2 basic order.”*

(U) Execution. *Civil-military operations is a supporting operation to the MAGTF’s scheme of maneuver. As such, CMO can be categorized as nonlethal fires, a subset of the Fires warfighting function or CMO can be a stand-alone, additive operation to the warfighting functions. Discuss the MAGTF’s scheme of maneuver broadly and use subsequent paragraphs to spell out the details of CMO.*

a. (U) Civil-Military Operations Problem Statement. *A narrative that describes the problem that needs to be solved as viewed through the CMO lens.*

b. (U) Concept of Civil-Military Operations. *The written description of the CMO concept of support. The disposition of organic CA units should be discussed here. Civil-military operation enablers, such as Marine CA capabilities, nonorganic units or organizations can be broadly described here. If included in the basic order the CMO concept of support*

paragraph can be restated here. In most cases, the basic order paragraph 3 “Supporting Concepts” will refer the reader to the Annex G. Describe the functions of CMO that will support the specific operation (e.g., FHA, PRC, CIM).

(1) (U) *Describe the CMO core tasks that will support the specific operation. (e.g., nation assistance, FHA, PRC, CIM). These core tasks may be described here in general terms or direct the reader to an appendix for a more detailed discussion.*

(a) (U) Populace and Resources Control. *Discuss the definition as it applies to the operation. In a lethal operation, PRC will likely be of great importance to secure noncombatants and isolate them from decisive actions in the battlespace along with the identification of CMO resources necessary to reconstruct and support the population in the post hostility environment.*

(2) (U) Battlespace Framework. *The battlespace framework will be established by the command element OPT. The two main ways the commander does this is by organization of the force and organization of the battlespace. The commander organizes the force by main effort, supporting efforts, reserve, and security. The commander organizes the battlespace in one of three ways, spatially (deep, close, rear), functionally (decisive, shaping, and sustaining actions), LOO.*

(3) (Example) Lines of Operation. *Based on the battlespace construct, defines or describes how the battlespace is organized. Must support the construct described in the basic order. The graphic and narrative should be captured in Appendix 18 of Annex C. As a fall back, the CMO graphic and narrative should be captured in a supporting Appendix to Annex G.*

(a) (U) (Example) Provide Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Definition. *Define each LOO to tell others “what you mean by....” Civil-military operations actions are not specific to a single LOO, CMO supports all the LOOs determined by the commander.*

1 (U) Civil-Military Operations Objectives. *Discuss the CMO objectives for this stage of the operation. Objectives may be specific by each portion of the phasing construct or may be overarching and apply to the phase as a whole.*

2 (U) Civil-Military Operations Desired Effects. *Discuss the associated desired effects as results of actions within the phasing construct. As with objectives, desired effects may be detailed to each portion of the phasing construct or may apply to a phase as a whole.*

(4) (U) Phase 1. *Describe the CMO actions within each phase (and stage) as required.*

(a) (U) Stage A

(b) (U) Stage B

c. (U) Tasks. *Specify tasks by the major subordinate command, unit, or element responsible for accomplishing them. These tasks should be included in the basic order for these units.*

(1) (U) Command Element. *Encompassed in the command element are the staff sections, the commander, the Marine CA staff, and other associated capabilities that need to support CMO. Annex A is a good place to review those capabilities attached to the command element. Elements such as military information support operations, combat camera and public affairs, may be included here or may need to be called out specifically to be assigned pertinent tasks.*

(a) (U)

(2) (U) Ground Combat Element (e.g., RLT-X)

- (a) (U)
- (3) (U) Logistics Combat Element (e.g., CLR-X)
- (a) (U)
- (4) (U) Aviation Combat Element (e.g., MAG-XX)
- (a) (U)

d. (U) Coordinating Instructions. *Contains instructions common to two or more units or elements that outline coordinating details, possible control measures applicable to the command as a whole, and time or conditions when the plans are to be executed. These should also be included in the basic order. Some key CMO coordinating instructions include: CIM requirements and the assessment plan. Refer the reader to appropriate appendices for further information as necessary. Ensure that these appendices have been written and are part of the order.*

e. (U) Civil-Military Operations Priority Information Requirements. *Discuss those CMO information requirements that may be tied to decision points, named areas of interest or even CMO specific CCIRs.*

(U) Administration and Logistics

a. (U) Administration. *Administrative control is not an inherent command relationship for operational control, tactical control or for supporting relationships; therefore, these topics need to be addressed in the order. Examples are discuss situation reports, morning reports, accountability, awards and fitness report responsibilities for the Marine CA units attached to the MAGTF that may be re-allocated throughout the MAGTF. You may want to include non-standard reporting procedures to IO/NGOs and GS requirements to these organizations. Also consider referencing any letters of agreement or status-of-forces agreements which may detail modalities between US forces and host nation or IO/NGOs.*

b. (U) Logistics. *An extension of administrative control is the logistical support for CA units. Outline the types of logistical and classes of supply needed to be provided by supported units for the supporting CA units.*

(U) Command and Control

a. (U) Command Relationships. *Contains guidance on command relationships as designated by higher for the operation. It is important to spell out the command relationships of CA forces with their respective supported units. This information needs to be included in Annex J as well.*

b. (U) Signal. *Can be described here but usually can be found in the Annex K (Communications System Support), in most case just refer the reader to "See Annex K."*

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF XXX

I.M. Marine
Colonel, USMC
Chief of Staff

APPENDICIES (*Example Appendices listed for consideration*)

1. Civil Preparation of the Battlespace
2. Populace and Resources Control
3. Protected Target List
4. Host Nation Support
5. IOs/NGOs
6. Civil Information Management
7. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center Procedures
8. Dislocated Civilian Operations
9. Civil-Military Operations Funding Policies
10. Reintegration
11. Graphics and or Overlays

OFFICIAL:

XXX XXXX

Colonel, USMC

AC/S G-3

APPENDIX C

PLANNER TEMPLATE (ANNEX V)

Issuing Headquarters

Place of Issue

Date/Time Group

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS STAFF ESTIMATE NUMBER:

REFERENCES:

1. Supported Command Mission Statement. From the commander or the OPT.
2. Civil-Military Operations Problem Statement. Problem statement results from problem framing analysis.
3. Situation and Considerations
 - a. Characteristics of the Area of Operation
 - (1) Weather. Focus on short term and long-term weather concerns for the population – rainy season, planting season, harvest, and festivals. What are the effects of the weather on population and culture – freedom of movement, livelihood. How do weather and terrain impact the culture – isolation, restricted economics, and resource allocation.
 - (2) Terrain. How does terrain affect the population? How will terrain and land use impact expected military operations?
 - (3) Civil Considerations. Analyze political, military (security forces), economic, sociological, infrastructure and information domains combined with psychological factors to form networks and develop cultural relationships as they relate to expected military operations.

Note: As you look at the AO, consideration must be given to the area of interest. In certain CMO or stability operations the area of interest may include areas of extended family/clan/tribal connections, refugee camps and traditional lines of communication all which may have influence on the MAGTF's operations.

b. Enemy Forces

- (1). Adversary disposition, composition, strengths, capabilities, and COA(s) as they affect specific CMO areas of concern.

Note: Focus on those items that would compete with CMO – adversary's ability to provide essential services, rule of law, etc.

- (2) High value individuals with adversary ties or networks.

c. Friendly Forces

- (1) Civil affairs organic—to include capabilities and current locations
 1. Staffing and training levels
 2. Military occupational specialty mix (most CA forces possess an additional MOS)
 3. Professional experience (Reserve Component Marines have other skill sets worth highlighting such as health specialists, civil engineers, law enforcement)
- (2) Civil affairs external—Units, capabilities, and current locations of forces external to the MAGTF or chain of command.
- (3) Civil-military operations military enablers—Capabilities and current location (information operations, PA, legal, combat camera, etc.)
- (4) US Government enablers—capabilities and current and proposed locations. (e.g., USAID, OFDA, DOS)
- (5) Current status of resources (e.g., humanitarian, relief, transportation)
- (6) Host nation
 1. Military forces to include capabilities and current and anticipated locations
 2. Government services
 3. Private organizations (e.g., NGOs, church groups, civic groups, etc.)
 4. Intergovernmental organizations (e.g., World Health Organization, UNICEF, Red Crescent, Red Cross)
- (7) Coalition forces to include capabilities and current and anticipated locations
- (8) Current status of other resources
- (9) Resources available (such as money and funding programs)
- (10) Comparison of requirements versus capabilities and recommended solutions
- (11) Key considerations (evaluation criteria) for COA supportability

d. Civilian Considerations.

- (1) Describe additional personnel, groups, or associations (NGOs, IOs, other government agencies) that cannot be categorized as either friendly or enemy. Discuss the possible impact these entities may have on CMO (noncombatant movement and noncombatant ability to influence or affect planned military operations and CMO). Capture points of contact and means of contact.
- (2) Civil Planning Consideration. (CPB results)
 - (a) Instability/Stability Dynamics. (Note: Not always a consideration, however, the CMO planner needs to be aware of these dynamics to recommend planning considerations that reinforce Stability Dynamics and downplay Instability Dynamics)
 - (b) Cultural Environment.
 - (c) Local Perceptions.
 - (d) Civil-military operations assessment of the physical environment.

e. Assumptions: Those pieces of information necessary and needed for planning to continue. Information that is assumed to be true in order for planning to continue. (A planning assumption needs to have associated methods to continue to collect information to validate the assumption prior to execution of the plan: An associated RFI, decision point or possible CCIR).

4. Course(s) of Action

a.

b.

5. Civil-Military Operations Course(s) of Action

a.

b.

6. Analysis of Course(s) of Action. Analyze each selected COA using the commander's evaluation criteria to determine advantages and disadvantages. (Note: As a result of wargaming)

a. COA 1

b. COA 2

7. Course of Action Comparison. Compare COA(s) using key considerations. Rank each COA(s) for each key consideration. Visually support each comparison with a decision matrix. (Note: This is done prior to the commander's comparison and decision brief)

8. Recommendations and Conclusions

a. Recommended COA based on the comparison (most supportable from a CMO perspective).

b. Issues, deficiencies, and risks (associated with assumptions) with impact mitigations.

APPENDIX D

RECOMMENDED REFERENCES FOR CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

USAID OFDA Field Operations Guide:

http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/resources/pdf/foog_v4.pdf

USAID OFDA Guidance Cable on Disaster Planning and Response 2012:

http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/resources/pdf/foog_v4.pdf

DoD Support to Foreign Disaster Assistance Handbook for JTF Commanders:

<http://www.fas.org/irp/DoDdir/DoD/disaster.pdf>

Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster

Response: <http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/95530/The-Sphere-Project-Handbook-20111.pdf>

Fund for Peace: Failed States Index: <http://global.fundforpeace.org/index.php>

United States Institute of Peace: <http://www.usip.org//pubs/specialreports/srs/srs5.html>

USIP Guide to Participants in Peace, Stability and Relief Operations:

<http://www.usip.org/publications/guide-participants-in-peace-stability-and-relief-operations-web-version>

World Bank: World Development Report 2011 – Conflict, Security and

Development: <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/world-development-report-education-2011-en.pdf>

USIP Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction:

http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/guiding_principles_full.pdf

Relief Web: OCHA’s global hub for time-critical humanitarian information on complex emergencies and natural disasters: <http://www.reliefweb.int>

Federal Emergency Management Agency: <http://www.fema.gov>

International Committee of the Blue Shield: <http://icom.museum/emergency.html>

US Committee of the Blue Shield: <http://www.uscbs.org>

GLOSSARY

SECTION I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	after action report
AC	Active Component
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
CA	civil affairs
CAG	civil affairs group
CAO	civil affairs operations
CAT	civil affairs team
CCDR	combatant commander
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CIM	civil information management
CME	civil-military engagement
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
CMOWG	civil-military operations working group
COA	course of action
COM	chief of mission
COMMSTRAT	communication strategy and operations
CONOPS	concept of operations
COP	common operational picture
CPB	civil preparation of the battlespace
CR	civil reconnaissance
CSO	Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (DOS)
DART	disaster assistance response team
DATT	defense attaché
DC	dislocated civilian
DCHA	Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID)
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration (DOJ)
DoD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
EAC	emergency action committee
FDR	foreign disaster relief
FFP	Office of Food for Peace (USAID)
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FID	foreign internal defense

FOO..... field ordering officer
 G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence/intelligence staff section
 G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations and training/operations and training staff section
 G-5 assistant chief of staff, plans/plans staff section
 G-9 assistant chief of staff, civil affairs/civil affairs staff section
 GCC geographic combatant commander
 GCE..... ground combat element

 HA..... humanitarian assistance
 HACC humanitarian assistance coordination center
 HN..... host nation
 HOC humanitarian operations center
 HQ..... headquarters

 ICITAP..... International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (DOJ)
 ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
 IDAD..... internal defense and development
 IOM..... International Organization for Migration
 IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
 IPI..... indigenous populations and institutions
 ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

 J-3..... operations directorate of a joint staff
 J-9..... civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff
 JFC joint force commander
 JP..... joint publication
 JTF joint task force

 LOO line of operation

 M&E monitoring and evaluation
 MAGTF..... Marine air-ground task force
 MARFOR CENTCOM..... Marine Forces Central Command
 MARFORRES Marine Forces Reserve
 MCMO medical civil-military operations
 MCPP Marine Corps Planning Process
 MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
 MDRO..... mission disaster response officer
 MEB..... Marine expeditionary brigade
 MEF Marine expeditionary force
 METT-T..... mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available
 MEU..... Marine expeditionary unit
 MIG..... Marine expeditionary force information group
 MISO..... military information support operations
 MITAM..... mission tasking matrix

MOE..... measure of effectiveness
MOP.....measure of performance
MOS..... military occupational specialty

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO.....nongovernmental organization

OFDA.....Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)
OIC..... officer in charge
OPT.....operational planning team
OPSEC..... operations security
OTI.....Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID)

PIRpriority intelligence requirement
PM..... Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DOS)
PMESIIpolitical, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
POLAD.....political advisor
PRC..... populace and resources control
PRTprovincial reconstruction team

QDDR quadrennial diplomacy and development review

RCT.....regimental combat team
RFA..... request for assistance
RFI request for information
RLTregimental landing team
RSO..... regional security officer

S-2..... intelligence officer/intelligence office
S-3.....operations and training officer/operations and training office
S-5.....plans officer/plans office
SAFStability Assessment Framework
SC..... security cooperation
SCA..... support to civil administration
SCO..... security cooperation organization
SDO..... senior defense official
SecDef..... Secretary of Defense
SJA staff judge advocate
SME subject matter expert

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UN..... United Nations
UNHCR..... United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
US United States

USAID United States Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM..... United States Central Command
USDA..... United States Department of Agriculture
USG..... United States Government
USINDOPACOM..... United States Indo-Pacific Command

SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

administrative control—Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support. Also called **ADCON**. (DoD Dictionary)

area of influence—An area inclusive of and extending beyond an operational area wherein a commander is capable of direct influence by maneuver, fire support, and information normally under the commander's command or control. (DoD Dictionary)

area of interest—That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent to it, and extending into enemy territory. Also called **AOI**. See also **area of influence**. (DoD Dictionary)

area of operations—An operational area defined by a commander for the land or maritime force commander to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called **AO**. See also **area of responsibility**; **joint operations area**; **joint special operations area**. (DoD Dictionary)

area of responsibility—The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which the combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called **AOR**. See also **combatant command**. (DoD Dictionary)

assessment—Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity. (Part 3 of a 4-part definition. (DoD Dictionary)

chief of mission—The principal officer in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual temporarily assigned to be in charge of such a facility. Also called **COM**. (DoD Dictionary)

civil administration—An administration established by a foreign government in friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government or in hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (DoD Dictionary)

civil affairs—Designated Active Component and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called **CA**. See also **civil-military operations**. (DoD Dictionary)

civil affairs operations—Actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called **CAO**. (DoD Dictionary)

civil information management—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central

database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other United States Government and Department of Defense agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations. Also called **CIM**. (USMC Dictionary)

civil-military operations—Activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called **CMO**. See also **civil affairs; operation**. (DoD Dictionary)

civil-military operations center—An organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the commander. Also called **CMOC**. See also **civil-military operations; operation**. (DoD Dictionary)

civil reconnaissance—A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events. Also called **CR**. (DoD Dictionary)

combatant command—A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called **CCMD**. (DoD Dictionary)

combatant commander—A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called **CCDR**. See also **combatant command**. (DoD Dictionary)

commander's critical information requirement—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Information regarding the enemy and friendly activities and the environment identified by the commander as critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decision-making. The two subcategories are priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirements. Also called **CCIR**. (USMC Dictionary)

common operational picture—A single, identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called **COP**. (DoD Dictionary)

concept of operations—A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. Also called **CONOPS**. (DoD Dictionary)

concept plan—An operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete operation plan or operation order. Also called **CONPLAN**. See also **operation plan**. (DoD Dictionary)

country team—The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission. Also called **CT**. (DoD Dictionary)

course of action—A scheme developed to accomplish a mission. Also called **COA**. (Part 2 of a 2-part definition.) (DoD Dictionary)

disaster assistance response team—A team of specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, rapidly deployed to assist US embassies and United States Agency for International Development missions with the management of US Government response to disasters. Also called **DART**. (DoD Dictionary)

dislocated civilian—A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also called **DC**. See also **refugee**. (DoD Dictionary)

effect—1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (DoD Dictionary)

emergency action committee—An organization established at a foreign service post to direct and coordinate the post's response to contingencies. Also called **EAC**. (DoD Dictionary)

fires—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Those means used to delay, disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy capabilities, forces, or facilities as well as affect the enemy's will to fight. Fires is one of the seven warfighting functions. (USMC Dictionary)

force protection—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Actions or efforts used to safeguard own centers of gravity while protecting, concealing, reducing, or eliminating friendly critical vulnerabilities. Force protection is one of the seven warfighting functions. Also called **FP**. (USMC Dictionary)

foreign humanitarian assistance—Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called **FHA**. (DoD Dictionary)

foreign internal defense—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Participation by civilian, military, and law enforcement agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free

and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called **FID**. (USMC Dictionary)

fragmentary order—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) An abbreviated form of an operation order, usually issued on a day-to-day basis, that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. It may be issued in sections. Also called **FRAGO**. (USMC Dictionary)

general support—Support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. (Part 1 of a 2-part definition.) (DoD Dictionary)

host nation—A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called **HN**. (DoD Dictionary)

humanitarian assistance coordination center—A temporary center established by a geographic combatant commander to assist with interagency coordination and planning during the early planning and coordination stages of foreign humanitarian assistance operations. Also called **HACC**. See also **foreign humanitarian assistance**. (DoD Dictionary)

humanitarian operations center—An international and interagency body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation. Also called **HOC**. (DoD Dictionary)

indigenous populations and institutions—The societal framework of an operational environment including citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, dislocated civilians, and governmental, tribal, ethnic, religious, commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called **IPI**. (DoD Dictionary)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. Also called **IPB**. (USMC Dictionary)

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—An integrated operations and intelligence activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors; assets; and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. Also called **ISR**. (Part 1 of a 2-part definition) (DoD Dictionary)

interagency—Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. See also **interagency coordination**. (DoD Dictionary)

interagency coordination—The planning and synchronization of efforts that occur between elements of Department of Defense and participating United States Government departments and agencies. (DoD Dictionary)

internal defense and development—The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called **IDAD**. See also **foreign internal defense**. (DoD Dictionary)

internally displaced person—Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular, as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who has not crossed an internationally recognized state border. Also called **IDP**. (DoD Dictionary)

interorganizational cooperation—The interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (DoD Dictionary)

irregular warfare—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) A type of warfare that favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. Also called **IW**. (USMC Dictionary)

joint task force—A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander to accomplish a specific mission. Also called **JTF**. (DoD Dictionary)

line of operation—A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). Also called **LOO**. (DoD Dictionary)

Marine air-ground task force—The Marine Corps' principal organization for all missions across the range of military operations, composed of forces task-organized under a single commander capable of responding rapidly to a contingency anywhere in the world. The types of forces in the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) are functionally grouped into four core elements: a command element, an aviation combat element, a ground combat element, and a logistics combat element. The four core elements are categories of forces, not formal commands. The basic structure of the MAGTF never varies, though the number, size, and type of Marine Corps units comprising each of its four elements will always be mission dependent. The flexibility of the organizational structure allows for one or more subordinate MAGTFs to be assigned. In a joint or multinational environment, other Service or multinational forces may be assigned or attached. Also called **MAGTF**. (USMC Dictionary)

Marine Corps Planning Process—A six-step methodology which helps organize the thought processes of the commander and staff throughout the planning and execution of military operations. It focuses on the mission and the threat and is based on the Marine Corps philosophy of maneuver warfare. It capitalizes on the principle of unity of command and supports the

establishment and maintenance of tempo. The six steps consist of problem framing, course of action development, course of action war game, course of action comparison and decision, orders development, and transition. Also called **MCPP**. (USMC Dictionary)

Marine expeditionary brigade—A Marine air-ground task force that is constructed around an infantry regiment reinforced, a composite Marine aircraft group, and a combat logistics regiment. The Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), commanded by a general officer, is task-organized to meet the requirements of a specific situation. It can function as part of a joint task force, as the lead echelon of the Marine expeditionary force, or alone. It varies in size and composition and is larger than a Marine expeditionary unit but smaller than a Marine expeditionary force. The MEB is capable of conducting missions across the range of military operations. In a joint or multinational environment, it may also contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task force. Also called **MEB**. (USMC Dictionary)

Marine expeditionary force—The largest Marine air-ground task force and the Marine Corps' principal warfighting organization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized around a permanent command element and normally contains one or more Marine divisions, Marine aircraft wings, and Marine logistics groups. The Marine expeditionary force is capable of missions across a range of military operations, including amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore in any environment. It can operate from a sea base, a land base, or both. In a joint or multinational environment, it may also contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task force. Also called **MEF**. (USMC Dictionary)

Marine expeditionary unit—A Marine air-ground task force that is constructed around an infantry battalion reinforced, a composite squadron reinforced, and a task-organized logistics combat element. It normally fulfills Marine Corps' forward sea-based deployment requirements. The Marine expeditionary unit provides an immediate reaction capability for crisis response and is capable of limited combat operations. In a joint or multinational environment, it may contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task force. Also called **MEU**. (USMC Dictionary)

measure of effectiveness—An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. Also called **MOE**. (DoD Dictionary)

measure of performance—An indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called **MOP**. (DoD Dictionary)

military information support operations—Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **MISO**. (DoD Dictionary)

multinational force—A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called **MNF**. (DoD Dictionary)

natural disaster—A situation that poses significant danger to life and property that results from a natural cause. (DoD Dictionary)

network engagement—Interactions with friendly, neutral, and threat networks conducted continuously and simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. (DoD Dictionary)

noncombatant evacuation operation—The withdrawal of civilians and noncombatants from a threatened area abroad that is carried out with the assistance of the Department of Defense. Also called **NEO**. (DoD Dictionary)

nongovernmental organization—A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called **NGO**. (DoD Dictionary)

operation plan—A complete and detailed plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment list. Also called **OPLAN**. (DoD Dictionary)

operational control—The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Also called **OPCON**. See also **combatant command**. (DoD Dictionary)

operational planning team—A group built around the future operations section that integrates the staff representatives and resources. The operational planning team may have representatives or augmentation from each of the standard staff sections, the seven warfighting functions, staff liaisons, and/or subject matter experts. Also called **OPT**. (USMC Dictionary)

peacekeeping—Military operations undertaken, with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (DoD Dictionary)

populace and resources control—Control measures that assist host nation governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder joint mission accomplishment. Populace and resources control measures seek to identify, reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or otherwise threaten joint operation success. Also called **PRC**. (USMC Dictionary)

priority intelligence requirement—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) An intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will critically affect the overall success of the command's mission. Also called **PIR**. (USMC Dictionary)

private sector—An umbrella term that may be applied to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations. (DoD Dictionary)

provincial reconstruction team—A civil-military team designated to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of a host nation local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services. Also called **PRT**. (DoD Dictionary)

regional security officer—A security officer responsible to the chief of mission (ambassador), for security functions of all United States embassies and consulates in a given country or group of adjacent countries. Also called **RSO**. (DoD Dictionary)

request for information—Any specific, time-sensitive, ad hoc requirement for intelligence information or products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. Also called **RFI**. (DoD Dictionary)

Reserve Component—The Armed Forces of the United States Reserve Component consists of the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. Also called **RC**. (DoD Dictionary)

security assistance—A group of programs authorized by federal statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Also called **SC**. See also **security cooperation**. (DoD Dictionary)

security cooperation—Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners. Also called **SC**. See also **security assistance**. (DoD Dictionary)

security sector reform—A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. (DoD Dictionary)

solatium—Monetary compensation given in areas where it is culturally appropriate to alleviate grief, suffering, and anxiety resulting from injuries, death, and property loss with a monetary payment. (DoD Dictionary)

stabilization activities—Various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (DoD Dictionary)

staff judge advocate—A judge advocate so designated in the Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps, and the principal legal advisor of a Navy, Coast Guard, or joint force command who is a judge advocate. Also called **SJA**. (DoD Dictionary)

support to civil administration—Actions that help continue or stabilize management by a governing body of a foreign nation's civil structure by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. Support to civil administration consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting with those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports United States and multinational objectives. Also called **SCA**. (USMC Dictionary)

tactical control—The authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Also called **TACON**. See also **combatant command**; **operational control**. (DoD Dictionary)

United States—A North American country consisting of 50 states, a federal district, and 14 territories, to include the land areas, internal waters, territorial seas, and airspace, over which the United States Government has complete jurisdiction and control or has exclusive authority or defense responsibility. (DoD Dictionary)

unity of effort—Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization that is the product of successful unified action. (DoD Dictionary)

weapons of mass destruction—Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, excluding the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. (DoD Dictionary)

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3000.05 Stability Operations

Joint Publications

2-0 Joint Intelligence
3-0 Joint Campaigns and Operations
3-06 Joint Urban Operations
3-08 Interorganizational Cooperation
3-28 Defense Support to Civil Authorities
3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
3-57 Civil-Military Operations
3-60 Joint Targeting
3-61 Public Affairs
3-68 Joint Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Marine Corps Publications

Marine Corps Doctrine Publications (MCDPs)

1 Marine Corps Operations
1-4 Competing
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3-02A Network Engagement: Targeting and Engaging Networks
3-03B MTTP for Peace Operations
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